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2.	INTRODUCTION	Worry	is	an	activity	that	most	people	experience	fairly	regularly	and	it	is	usually	in	response	to	uncertainty	about	future	events.	Worry	has	been	defined	as	“a	chain	of	thoughts	and	images,	negatively	affect-laden	and	relatively	uncontrollable”	(Borkovec,	Robinson,	Pruzinsky	&	DePree,	 1983,	 p.	 10).	 For	 some	 people,	worry	 can	 become	 excessive	and	 uncontrollable	 and	 can	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 social	 and	occupational	functioning.	This	type	of	excessive,	pathological	worry	is	cited	as	the	defining	 feature	of	generalized	anxiety	disorder	(GAD)	 in	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Psychiatric	Disorders	(DSM-5,	American	Psychiatric	Association,	2013).		When	worry	becomes	pathological,	it	causes	significant	distress	and	 impairment	 in	 functioning	 (DSM-5,	 American	 Psychiatric	Association,	 2013),	 which	 begs	 the	 question	 of	 why	 people	 worry,	what	function	does	it	serve?	Some	theories	have	examined	the	role	of	worry	 as	 being	 a	 strategy	 to	 avoid	 negative	 physiological	 responses	(e.g.	the	cognitive	avoidance	model;	Borkovec,	Alcaine,	&	Behar,	2004;	Borkovec	 &	 Roemer,	 1995),	 or	 a	 maladaptive	 attempt	 to	 cope	 with	negative	 emotions	 (e.g.	 the	 emotion	 dysregulation	 model;	 Turk,	Heimberg,	 Luterek,	 Mennin,	 &	 Fresco,	 2005).	 	 Given	 that	 worry	 is	primarily	a	cognitive	process,	cognitive	models	of	worry	(e.g.	Davey	&	Meeten,	 2016;	 Hirsch	 &	 Mathews,	 2012)	 have	 examined	 cognitive	mechanisms	thought	to	drive	and	maintain	pathological	worry.		Hirsch	 &	 Mathews	 (2012)	 focused	 on	 cognitive	 constructs	thought	to	be	causally	related	to	worry.	They	proposed	that	bottom-up	information	processing	biases	in	attention	and	interpretation	and	top–down	 processing	 such	 as	 attentional	 control,	 influence	 threat	representations	at	a	preconscious	level	and	serve	to	maintain	focus	on	threat.	 Attentional	 and	 interpretation	 biases	 that	 favour	 threat	 also	increase	 the	chance	of	 threat	 representations	coming	 into	awareness	and	being	experienced	as	an	intrusive	negative	thought.	Once	intrusive	negative	 thoughts	 occur,	 Hirsch	 and	 Mathews	 (2012)	 propose	 that	bottom	up	processes	continue	to	operate.	In	addition,	worry	in	verbal	
	 8	
form	develops	and	other	conscious	processes	occur	such	as	allocation	of	attentional	control	 resources	 to	 the	negative	 intrusive	 thoughts,	 in	an	attempt	to	problem	solve	leading	to	excessive,	pathological	worry.		The	 Davey	 and	 Meeten	 (2016)	 model	 of	 perseverative	 worry	shares	some	 features	of	 the	Hirsch	and	Mathews	(2012)	model.	Both	models	 highlight	 the	 role	 of	 information	 processing	 biases	 in	 the	involuntary	 allocation	 of	 attention	 and	 information	 processing	resources	 to	 threat.	 Davey	 and	Meeten	 (2016)	 examine	 some	 of	 the	behavioural	 and	 cognitive	 processes	 that	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 threat	perception	 and	 are	 proposed	 to	 influence	 worry	 both	 causally	 and	indirectly	 through	 other	 processes.	 Once	 threat	 perception	 occurs,	they	 suggest	 that	 maladaptive	 beliefs	 about	 worry	 influence	 worry	perseveration.	 These	 include	 positive	 beliefs	 about	 worry	 (e.g.	 the	belief	that	worry	is	a	useful	and	important	processes),	which	Davey	&	Meteen	 (2016)	 propose	 influence	 goal	 directed	worry	 rules	 (e.g.	 the	rules	that	people	implicitly	or	explicitly	follow	when	deciding	whether	to	 continue	 or	 stoop	worrying),	which	 then	 causally	 influence	worry	perseveration.	 Davey	 and	 Meeten	 (2016)	 also	 consider	 the	 role	 of	negative	mood	 in	worry	perseveration	and	how	mood	facilitates	goal	directed	worry	rules	and	systematic	(careful	and	thorough)	processing	styles.	Proximal	 models	 of	 worry	 (Davey	 &	 Meteen,	 2016;	 Hirsch	 &	Mathews,	2012)	are	helpful	in	defining	and	refining	our	understanding	of	the	cognitive	processes	that	contribute	to	pathological	worry.	While	these	models	 focus	 on	 cognitive	 processes	 that	 drive	 and	maintain	 a	worry	bout,	 they	also	overlap	with	other	 commonly	 cited	 theories	of	worry	 that	 address	 cognitive	 constructs	 in	 worry	 such	 as	 the	intolerance	of	uncertainty	model	(Dugas,	Freeston,	&	Ladouceur,	1997;	Dugas,	 Gagnon,	 Ladouceur,	 &	 Freeston,	 1998)	 and	 the	metacognitive	model	of	 	GAD	(Wells,	1995,	1999,	2006).	However,	as	highlighted	by	Hirsch	and	Mathews	(2012),	evidence	that	some	of	these	factors	have	a	causal	relationship	with	worry	is	inconclusive.	
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Pathological	 worry	 is	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 GAD	 and	approximately	 only	 50%	 of	 individuals	 with	 GAD	 achieve	 full	remission	after	treatment	(Loerinc	et	al.,	2015).	As	noted	by	Hofmann	(2014),	 an	 integral	part	of	developing	effective	 cognitive-behavioural	treatment	 models	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 maladaptive	 cognitive	processes	 that	 cause	 distressing	 symptomatology,	 such	 as	 worry	 in	GAD.	It	is	thus	important	to	remain	curious	and	continue	to	update	and	refine	 cognitive	 models	 of	 worry	 based	 on	 scientific	 evidence.	 The	present	 review	 focuses	 on	 experimental	 psychopathology	 literature	and	 seeks	 to	 clarify	 what	 evidence	 there	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 that	cognitive	constructs	thought	to	be	relevant	in	pathological	worry,	have	a	 causal	 relationship	 with	 worry,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 correlational	relationship	or	being	a	consequence	of	worry.	If	evidence	suggests	that	constructs	 causally	 relate	 to	 worry,	 then	 those	 constructs	 can	 be	usefully	 targeted	 in	 treatment.	 The	 cognitive	 constructs	 included	 in	this	review	were	selected	by	examining	proximal	models	of	worry	and	looking	 at	 factors	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	 and	perseveration	of	a	worry	episode	(e.g.	Davey	&	Meeten,	2016;	Hirsch	&	Mathews,	2012).	A	second	strategy	was	to	consider	theories	of	worry	that	have	promoted	key	 cognitive	 constructs	as	 causal	mechanism	 in	the	 perseveration	 of	 worry	 (e.g.	 the	 construct	 of	 intolerance	 of	uncertainty	 (Dugas,	 Freeston,	 &	 Ladouceur,	 1997)	 and	 the	 roles	 of	positive	 and	 negative	metacognitive	 beliefs	 (Wells,	 1995,	 2006)	 in	 a	perseverative	worry	 bout.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 this	 review	 is	 not	intended	 to	 be	 an	 exhaustive	 account	 of	 all	 cognitive	 constructs	 that	have	 been	 related	 to	 pathological	 worry,	 rather	 an	 evaluation	 and	discussion	of	 cognitive	constructs	which	have	been	proposed	as	 core	elements	in	theories	of	pathological	worry	over	the	past	30	years	or	so.			
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2.1	Cognitive	characteristics	of	pathological	worry	
2.1.1.	 Cognitive	 constructs	 highlighted	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 worry	
bout	 The	 first	 section	will	 focus	on	cognitive	constructs	highlighted	as	 being	 important	 in	 the	 onset	 of	 a	worry	 bout	 and	 are	 considered	important	features	of	pathological	worry	(e.g.	Davey	&	Meeten,	2016;	Hirsch	 &	 Mathews,	 2012).	 Constructs	 considered	 are:	 information	processing	 biases	 (interpretation	 and	 attention	 biases),	 attentional	control	and	verbal	processing	of	threat	relevant	information.		
	2.1.1.1	Interpretation	bias	The	negative	interpretation	(as	opposed	to	a	benign	or	neutral	interpretation)	 of	 ambiguous	 information	 is	 given	 a	 role	 in	 both	 the	initiation	and	maintenance	of	pathological	worry	(Hirsch	&	Mathews,	2012;	Hirsch,	Meeten,	Krahé,	&	Reeder,	2016).	Both	interpretation	and	attention	 biases	 (see	 below	 for	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 role	 of	 attention	biases	 in	 worry)	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 relatively	 automatic,	 bottom-up	processes	that	occur	outside	of	awareness	(Hirsch	&	Mathews,	2012)	and	 lead	 to	 an	 over-representation	 of	 threat	 in	 the	 cognitive	 system	(Hirsch	&	Mathews,	 2012;	MacLeod	&	Rutherford,	 2004;	Mathews	&	Mackintosh,	1998).	Non-anxious	individuals	have	been	found	to	make	benign	 interpretations	of	ambiguous	 information	(Hirsch	&	Mathews,	1997;	Hirsch	&	Mathews,	 2000).	However,	 a	 number	of	 studies	have	demonstrated	 that	 high	 anxious	 individuals	 tend	 to	 interpret	ambiguous	 information	 in	 a	 threating	manner	 (Eysenck,	MacLeod,	 &	Mathews,	 1987;	 MacLeod	 &	 Cohen,	 1993;	 Mathews,	 Richards,	 &	Eysenck,	1989;	Ogniewicz,	Dugas,	Langlois,	Gosselin,	&	Koerner,	2014).	An	 increase	 in	 the	 frequency	 in	which	 high	 trait	 anxious	 individuals	generate	threat	interpretations	from	ambiguous	material	are	likely	to	contribute	to	both	triggering	and	maintaining	a	worry	bout	(Hirsch	&	Mathews,	 2012;	 Mathews,	 1990).	 More	 recently,	 research	 has	demonstrated	that	manipulation	of	interpretation	bias	causally	affects	negative	 intrusions	 after	 a	 worry	 period	 in	 both	 high	 trait	 worry	
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participants	 (Hirsch,	 Hayes,	 &	 Mathews,	 2009)	 and	 those	 with	 a	diagnosis	of	GAD	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	&	Mathews,	2010).		
2.1.1.2	Attention	bias	A	second	information	processing	bias	that	is	thought	to	initiate	and	 maintain	 worry	 is	 a	 threat	 interpretation	 bias.	 High	 anxious	individuals	 have	 been	 found	 to	 preferentially	 attend	 to	 threat	 at	 the	expense	 of	 positive	 or	 benign	 stimulus	 (Mathews,	 1990;	Mathews	 &	MacLeod,	 2002;	Mogg,	Mathews,	&	Eysenck,	 1992).	 	 Individuals	with	GAD	show	an	attentional	bias	 towards	threat.	For	example,	Mathews,	Mogg,	Kentish,	and		Eysenck	(1995)	showed	that	individuals	with	GAD	were	 slower	 to	 name	 colours	 on	 a	 Stroop	 task	 when	 the	 word	 was	threat-related	 as	 compared	 to	 non-anxious	 controls.	 There	 is	 mixed	evidence	 to	 support	 the	 theory	 that	 individuals	who	experience	high	levels	 of	worry	may	 also	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 disengage	 their	 attention	from	 threat	 stimuli	 (e.g.	 Fox,	 Russo,	 Bowles,	&	Dutton,	 2001;	Koster,	Crombez,	 Verschuere,	 &	 De	Houwer,	 2006;	Mogg,	 Holmes,	 Garner,	 &	Bradley,	 2008).	 Attentional	 engagement	 with	 meaning	 or	 content	 of	negative	 intrusions	 may	 facilitate	 worry	 (Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2011).		Experimental	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 attentional	 biases	 can	 be	manipulated	and	that	this	manipulation	has	a	transfer	effect	whereby	those	who	were	trained	to	attend	to	benign	stimuli	at	 the	expense	of	threat	 stimuli	 reported	 less	 negative	 thought	 intrusions	 during	 a	worry	 task	 (Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 &	 Mathews,	 2010;	 Krebs,	 Hirsch,	 &	Mathews,	2010).		
2.1.1.3	Attentional	control	An	 important	 aspect	 of	 working	 memory	 (Baddeley	 &	 Hitch,	1974)	 is	 attentional	 control.	Attentional	 control	 can	be	 thought	of	 as	the	ability	to	resist	or	suppress	distracting	information,	or	shift	 focus	of	 attention	 between	 tasks	 (Miyake	 et	 al.,	 2000).	 Attentional	 control	capacity	is	limited	and	worry	is	thought	to	take	up	attentional	control	(Hirsch	 &	 Mathews,	 2012)	 and	 reduces	 processing	 efficiency	 (e.g.	Eysenck,	 Derakshan,	 Santos,	 &	 Calvo,	 2007).	 Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 and	
	 12	
Mathews	 (2008)	 found	 that	 high	 worriers	 (as	 compared	 to	 a	 low	worry	 group)	 had	 reduced	 ability	 to	 exert	 attentional	 control	 when	thinking	 about	 a	 worry	 topic.	 	 This	 finding	 was	 replicated	 with	individuals	with	GAD	(Stefanopoulou,	Hirsch,	Hayes,	Adlam,	&	Coker,	2014).	 	Leigh	&	Hirsch	 (2011)	 found	 that	high	worriers	 (but	not	 low	worriers)	 had	 poor	 state	 attentional	 control	 as	 measured	 by	 a	questionnaire.	 High	 worriers	 also	 demonstrated	 reduced	 working	memory	 capacity	 (as	 measured	 by	 ability	 to	 generate	 a	 random	sequence	by	pressing	the	space	bar	on	the	keyboard)	when	worry	was	in	 its	 normal	 verbal	 form	 (Hirsch,	 Hayes,	 Mathews,	 Perman,	 &	Borkovec,	2012)	as	opposed	to	thinking	about	worries	in	imagery.	The	authors	 proposed	 that	 this	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 verbal	 nature	 of	worry	has	a	deleterious	effect	on	working	memory	resources.	Fox	and	colleagues	(Fox,	Dutton,	Yates,	Georgiou,	&	Mouchlianitis,	2015)	have	also	reported	a	link	between	improvements	in	attentional	control	and	improvements	in	ability	to	suppress	worry	related	thought	intrusions.	What	is	less	clear	and	will	be	explored	in	this	review	is	whether	there	is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	manipulating	 attentional	 control	 causally	affects	worry.		
2.1.1.4	Mentation	style	during	worry	Worry	is	described	as	predominantly	verbal	and	non-specific	in	content	(Hirsch	&	Mathews,	2012).	In	his	reduced	concreteness	theory	of	worry,	 Stöber	 (1998)	proposed	 that	worry	was	 abstract	 in	 nature	and	 that	 this	 reduced	 concreteness	 in	 worry	 suppresses	 imagery.	Stöber	 and	 Borkovec	 (2002)	 examined	 the	 concreteness	 of	 worry	topics	 described	 by	 individuals	with	 GAD	 and	 a	 non-anxious	 control	group.	They	 found	 that	participants	with	GAD	reported	 less	 concrete	worries	 than	 the	 control	 group.	 Yet	 after	 therapy,	 the	 two	 groups	demonstrated	 comparable	 concreteness	 in	 their	 worry	 descriptions.	There	 have	 been	 no	 assessments	 of	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	concreteness/abstractness	of	thought	and	worry.	However,	mentation	style	 (e.g.	 whether	 a	 threat	 representation	 is	 processed	 in	 an	
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abstract/verbal	 manner	 or	 in	 a	 concrete	 manner	 using	 imagery)	 is	now	 considered	 a	 transdiagnostic	 construct	 associated	 with	perseverative	thought	in	both	pathological	worry	and	depression	(e.g.	Goldwin	&	Behar,	2012;	McGowan	et	al.,	2017;	Stöber,	1998;	Stokes	&	Hirsch,	2010;	Watkins,	2008).	The	cognitive	avoidance	theory	of	worry	(Borkovec	et	al.,	2004)	proposes	that	worry	is	predominantly	verbal	as	this	 provides	 a	 way	 of	 avoiding	 	 distressing	 images.	 Hirsch	 and	colleagues	have	examined	how	worrying	 in	verbal	 form	as	compared	to	imagery	is	related	to	worry	perseveration.	One	study	demonstrated	that	 participants	 with	 GAD	 as	 compared	 to	 a	 non-anxious	 control	group	experienced	less	imagery	during	worry	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2012).	Research	 examining	 the	 causal	 role	 of	 verbal	 processing	 in	worry	 has	manipulated	mentation	 style	with	 individuals	who	 report	high	 levels	 of	 worry.	 Stokes	 and	 Hirsch	 (2010)	 found	 that	 verbal	mentation	style	(as	opposed	to	imagery)	was	associated	with	a	higher	number	 of	 negative	 intrusions	 in	 a	 worry	 task.	 Interestingly,	 verbal	worry	has	also	been	shown	to	 facilitate	attention	to	threat	(Williams,	Mathews,	&	Hirsch,	2014).	One	possibility	 is	 that	 this	highlights	a	bi-directional	 relationship	whereby	 attentional	 biases	may	 bring	 threat	stimuli	 into	awareness,	which	may	promote	a	worry	bout	 (usually	 in	verbal	 form),	 that	 in	 turn	 may	 facilitate	 attention	 to	 threat,	 which	serves	to	maintain	worry.		
2.1.2	Maladaptive	beliefs	about	worry			 A	 key	 component	 of	 pathological	 worry	 is	 its	 perseverative	nature.	 Once	 started,	 people	 who	 experience	 sub-clinical	 or	 clinical	levels	of	worry	often	find	it	hard	to	disengage	from	the	worry	bout.	A	number	 of	 cognitive	 constructs	 focus	 on	 beliefs	 that	 are	 thought	 to	drive	 the	 perseverative	 nature	 of	 worry,	 namely	 intolerance	 of	uncertainty	 (Dugas,	 Gagnon,	 Ladouceur,	 &	 Freeston,	 1998;	 Dugas,	Gosselin,	 &	 Ladouceur,	 2001;	 Ladouceur,	 Gosselin,	 &	 Dugas,	 2000),	positive	and	negative	beliefs	about	the	utility	of	worry	(Davey,	Tallis,	&	Capuzzo,	1996;	Wells,	1995,	2006)	and	goal	directed	worry	stop	rules	
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(Davey,	 2006a;	 Meeten	 &	 Davey,	 2011).	 These	 constructs	 focus	 on	beliefs	 that	 people	 who	 experience	 pathological	 worry	 hold	 about	uncertainty,	 or	 about	 the	 utility	 of	 worry,	 or	 about	 when	 it	 is	appropriate	to	stop	worrying.		
2.1.2.1	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	(IU)	Worry	is	characterised	by	concerns	about	the	future	where	the	outcome	 is	 unknown.	 A	 cognitive	 construct	 that	 has	 been	 linked	 to	worry	 perseveration	 is	 intolerance	 of	 uncertainty	 (IU).	 IU	 can	 be	defined	 as	 “a	 dispositional	 characteristic	 that	 results	 from	 a	 set	 of	negative	 beliefs	 about	 uncertainty	 and	 its	 implications”	 (Dugas	 &	Robichaud,	 2007,	 p.24).	 People	 high	 in	 IU	 have	 been	 found	 to	 over-estimate	 the	 probability	 of	 negative	 outcomes	 occurring	 and	 to	 seek	more	 information	 (than	 those	with	 low	 IU)	before	making	a	decision	(Ladouceur,	 Talbot,	 &	 Dugas,	 1997;	 Carleton,	 Sharpe,	 &	 Asmundson,	2007).	 Inability	 to	 tolerate	 uncertainty	 has	 been	 associated	 with	pathological	 worry,	 where	 individuals	 who	 have	 low	 tolerance	 to	uncertainty	continue	to	worry	in	an	attempt	to	resolve	the	uncertainty	(Dugas,	Freeston,	&	Ladouceur,	1997;	Koerner	&	Dugas,	2006).	Where	IU	has	been	experimentally	manipulated,	increasing	IU	has	been	found	to	causally	affect	worry	(Ladouceur,	Gosselin,	&	Dugas,	2000;	Meeten,	Dash,	Scarlet,	&	Davey,	2012).		 	
2.1.2.2.	Positive	and	negative	beliefs	about	worry	The	metacognitive	model	of	GAD	(Wells,	1995,	2006)	examines	the	 role	 of	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	 beliefs	 about	 worry.	 Positive	beliefs	 focus	 on	 the	 utility	 of	 worry	 e.g.	 “worrying	 will	 help	 me	 be	prepared	 for	whatever	 happens”	 and	 negative	 beliefs	 are	 a	 negative	appraisal	 of	 worry	 e.g.	 “worrying	 is	 harmful/dangerous”.	 There	 is	evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 people	who	 experience	 chronic	 worry	 hold	both	 positive	 and	 negative	 beliefs	 about	 worry	 (e.g.	 Borkovec	 &	Roemer,	 1995;	 Davey,	 Tallis,	 &	 Capuzzo,	 1996;	 Tallis,	 Davey,	 &	Capuzzo,	1994).		Cartwright-Hatton	and	Wells	 (1997)	used	 the	Meta-Cognitions	Questionnaire	 (MCQ)	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 pathological	 worry	 was	
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associated	with	positive	and	negative	beliefs	about	worry.	One	study	has	 experimentally	 manipulated	 positive	 and	 negative	 beliefs	 about	worry	 and	 examined	 their	 causal	 effect	 on	 worry	 (Prados,	 2011).	Prados	 (2011)	 reported	 that	 inducing	 positive	 and	 negative	 beliefs	about	 worry	 did	 not	 trigger	 worry,	 contrary	 to	 predictions	 by	 the	meta-cognitive	model.	However,	the	worry	measure	in	this	study	was	a	single-item	 visual	 analogue	 scale	 and	 is	 thus	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 valid	measure	of	worry.	
2.1.2.3	Goal	directed	worry	stop	rules		For	many	people,	worrying	 can	 serve	a	purpose,	whether	 it	 is	an	 attempt	 to	 manage	 distress	 associated	 with	 uncertainty,	 to	 feel	prepared	when	negative	outcomes	are	feared,	or	as	a	means	to	avoid	distressing	 images	 or	 further	 decreases	 in	 negative	 affect	 (all	discussed	 above).	 	 Goal	 directed	worry	 stop	 rules	 (Davey	&	Meeten,	2016;	Meeten	 &	 Davey,	 2011)	 are	 rules	 used	 implicitly	 or	 explicitly,	formed	by	 an	 individual	 to	 help	 them	decide	whether	 to	 continue	 to	worry.	 Examples	 of	 goal	 directed	 worry	 rules	 are:	 ‘I	 must	 focus	 on	every	 conceivable	 solution’	 or	 ‘I	must	 sort	 out	what	 is	worrying	me’	(Davey,	 Startup,	 MacDonald,	 Jenkins,	 &	 Patterson,	 2005).	 	 Research	suggests	 that	 high	 trait	worriers	possess	 a	 number	of	 characteristics	that	 makes	 them	 likely	 to	 believe	 they	 must	 continue	 to	 worry	 e.g.	positive	beliefs	about	the	utility	of	worry	(Borkovec	&	Roemer,	1995;	Davey,	 Tallis,	 &	 Capuzzo,	 1996;	 Tallis,	 Davey,	 &	 Capuzzo,	 1994)	 and	elevated	evidence	 requirements	 for	decision	making	 (Tallis,	Eysenck,	&	Mathews,	1991).	The	use	of	goal	directed	worry	rules	are	positively	associated	 with	 trait	 worry	 (PSWQ)	 and	 a	 behavioural	 measure	 of	worry	 (Davey,	 Startup,	 MacDonald,	 Jenkins,	 &	 Patterson,	 2005).	Individuals	 with	 GAD	 also	 show	 significantly	 higher	 endorsement	 of	goal	directed	worry	rules	than	a	non-anxious	control	group	(Meeten	et	al.,	2016).			 Pathological	worriers	tend	to	experience	high	levels	of	endemic	negative	mood	(Davey,	Hampton,	Farrell,	&	Davidson,	1992;	Meyer	et	al.,	 1990)	 and	 goal	 directed	worry	 rules	 (also	 known	 as	 ‘as	many	 as	
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can’	stop	rules)	are	assumed	to	interact	with	negative	mood	to	result	in	 worry	 perseveration	 (e.g.	 Davey,	 2006;	 Meeten	 &	 Davey,	 2011;	Startup	&	Davey,	2001).	For	example,	if	a	pathological	worrier	holds	a	rule	such	as	 ‘I	must	 think	about	this	concern	until	 I	 feel	prepared	for	every	possible	outcome’	and	they	are	in	a	negative	mood,	they	may	use	their	 current	 mood	 state	 as	 a	 source	 of	 information	 about	 whether	they	 have	 met	 their	 goal.	 The	 negative	 mood	 provides	 information	which	suggests	that	they	are	not	feeling	satisfied	or	that	the	tasks	goals	have	not	been	met	 (Martin,	Ward,	Achee,	&	Wyer,	1993).	 In	 this	way	the	worry	rule	adopted	and	the	concurrent	negative	mood	experienced	interact	 to	 influence	 worry	 perseveration.	 This	 interaction	 between	goal	directed	worry	rules	and	negative	mood	has	been	shown	to	have	a	causal	 effect	 on	 worry	 (Meeten	 &	 Davey,	 2012;	 Startup	 &	 Davey,	2001).	2.2.	Aims		Over	 the	 past	 30	 years,	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 cognitive	constructs	 thought	 to	 be	 important	 in	 worry	 has	 flourished.	 While	there	 is	 a	 wealth	 of	 evidence	 linking	 these	 constructs	 to	 worry	processes,	the	causal	contribution	of	these	constructs	to	worry	is	less	clear.	 As	 noted	 by	 Behar,	 DiMarco,	 Hekler,	 Mohlman,	 and	 Staples	(2009)	cognitive	models	of	GAD	often	present	causal	hypotheses,	but	there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 experimental	 evidence	 to	 support	 and	 test	 the	proposed	 models.	 A	 review	 of	 the	 literature	 which	 specifically	examines	experiments	seeking	to	determine	the	causal	contribution	of	these	 constructs	 to	 worry	 would	 be	 a	 helpful	 contribution	 to	understanding	 the	 current	 knowledge	 base	 in	 this	 area	 and	 provide	directions	 for	 future	 research	 and	 treatment.	 To	 understand	 the	relationship	between	cognitive	constructs	and	worry,	we	need	reliable	and	 valid	 assessments	 for	 manipulating	 these	 constructs	 and	 for	measuring	 worry	 under	 controlled	 conditions.	 Alongside	 examining	experimental	 evidence	 for	 the	 causal	 role	 of	 cognitive	 constructs	 in	worry,	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 manipulation	 of	 these	 cognitive	constructs	and	the	measurement	of	worry	in	the	laboratory	is	another	
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often	overlooked	 factor.	For	 this	 reason,	 the	present	 review	will	 also	examine	 assessments	 of	 worry	 employed	 in	 the	 experimental	psychopathology	 research	 and	 assessments	 of	 cognitive	 constructs	and	their	relationship	with	worry.	The	aim	of	the	present	review	is:		1.	To	 systematically	examine	 the	evidence	base	 for	 the	causal	 role	of	cognitive	constructs	proposed	to	be	important	in	the	development	and	maintenance	of	a	pathological	worry	bout.	Constructs	to	be	examined	are:	 information	 processing	 biases	 including	 interpretation	 and	attentional	 biases,	 attentional	 control,	 mentation	 style	 (verbal	 vs.	imagery),	 intolerance	 of	 uncertainty,	 positive	 and	 negative	 beliefs	about	worry,	and	goal	directed	worry	stop	rules.	




- Experimental	 study	 where	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 above	 named	cognitive	constructs	is	manipulated	with	a	control	condition	








- A	 non-validated	 worry	 questionnaire	 or	 a	 single-item	 worry	question	is	used	as	the	outcome	measure		The	rationale	 for	 these	 inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria	will	be	outlined.	 Studies	 were	 restricted	 to	 those	 written	 in	 English	 for	comprehension	reasons	and	to	participants	over	18	so	as	 to	 focus	on	an	 adult	 population	 (as	 defined	 by	 age	 ranges	 adhered	 to	 in	mental	health	 services	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom).	 Cognitive	 constructs	 must	have	been	manipulated	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 causal	 relationships	 and	an	 appropriate	 control	 group	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	effect	 of	 the	 experimental	 manipulation	 on	 the	 dependent	 variable.	The	outcome	measure	needed	to	be	an	established	measure	of	worry	so	 that	 some	 information	 on	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 measure	 could	 be	examined.	Studies	were	restricted	to	single	session	experiments.	Once	
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two	or	more	sessions	are	 introduced	it	creates	potential	confounders	where	 variables	 introduced	 between	 sessions	 and	 outside	 of	 the	experimental	 manipulation	 may	 influence	 the	 relationship	 between	the	construct	manipulated	and	the	outcome	variable.	 	The	population	chosen	 as	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 review	was	 a	 non-clinical	 sample,	 or	 high	trait	worriers,	or	individuals	with	a	diagnosis	of	GAD.	In	order	to	allow	for	 constructs	 relevant	 to	 pathological	 worry	 to	 be	 examined,	participants	with	a	primary	clinical	diagnosis	other	than	GAD	were	not	suitable	for	this	review.		3.4	Quality	assessment		The	 quality	 of	 the	 studies	 was	 assessed	 using	 selected	 items	from	the	Specialist	Unit	for	Review	Evidence	(SURE;	2013).	The	SURE	measure	 provides	 questions	 to	 assist	 with	 the	 critical	 appraisal	 of	randomised	 controlled	 trials	 and	other	 experimental	 studies.	 For	 the	purpose	 of	 this	 review,	 aspects	 of	 the	 SURE	 assessment	 that	 were	relevant	to	experimental	psychopathology	were	chosen	(see	Appendix	1	 for	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 quality	 assessment	 checklist).	 There	 were	 11	questions	scored	either	0	or	1	and	three	questions	were	scored	0,	1,	or	2	 to	 allow	 for	 differentiation	 between	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 measured	component	 and	 its	 quality.	 The	 questions	 examined	 key	 domains	 of	experimental	 psychopathology	 study	 design	 such	 as	 identification	 of	the	 cognitive	 construct	 to	 be	 examined	 and	 importantly	 its	manipulation	method,	the	appropriateness	of	the	comparator/control	condition,	 study	 confounders	 (e.g.	 are	 relevant	variables	 such	as	age,	gender,	or	baseline	levels	of	trait	worry,	measured	and	assessed	to	be	similar	 between	 groups	 at	 baseline),	 appropriateness	 of	 statistical	analysis,	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 type	 of	 worry	 task	 used	 as	 the	dependent	variable,	and	whether	the	study	conclusions	are	supported	by	 the	 results,	 and	 finally,	where	 limitations	 of	 the	 experiment	were	discussed.	 This	 review	 is	 examining	 research	with	 a	 time	 span	of	 24	years	 and	 best	 practice	 recommendations	 for	 research	 publication	have	 changed	 in	 that	 time.	 An	 obvious	 example	 is	 the	 reporting	 of	effect	 sizes	 in	 a	 published	 manuscript.	 This	 quality	 tool	 does	 not	
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withhold	 marks	 for	 non-publication	 of	 effect	 sizes,	 but	 this	 will	 be	discussed	 in	 considering	 best	 practice	 for	 experimental	psychopathology	research.		




















4.2	Participant	characteristics				 See	Table	1	 for	an	overview	of	participant	characteristics.	The	total	number	of	participants	in	the	13	studies	was	783.	Eight	studies	(n	=	 413)	 had	 a	 participant	 population	 comprised	 of	 students,	 three	studies	 (n	 =	 250)	 recruited	 staff	 and	 student	 participants,	 one	 study	recruited	a	community	high-trait	worry	sample	(n	=	80),	and	one	study	(n	=	40)	recruited	participants	who	had	a	diagnosis	of	GAD.	All	studies	were	 interested	 in	 examining	 how	 the	 manipulation	 of	 a	 cognitive	construct	 thought	 to	 be	 relevant	 to	 pathological	 worry,	 affected	 a	measure	 of	 worry	 in	 the	 laboratory.	 Studies	 varied	 in	 whether	 they	employed	 a	 clinical	 population	 (e.g.	 participants	 with	 a	 diagnosis	 of	GAD,	 (n	 =	 1),	 a	 high	 trait	worry	 population	 (n	 =	 6),	 a	 non-high	 trait	worry	population	(n	=	1),	both	high	worriers	and	non-worriers	(n	=	1),	or	no	worry	level	screening	(n	=	4).			Table	1	Study	characteristics			Study			 	Sample	 %	female	 Age	range	Mean	(SD)	 Ethnicity	
Interpretation	bias	papers	Hirsch,	Hayes,	 &	Mathews	(2009)	
N	=	40	High	worriers	(≥	 56	 on	PSWQ),	university	staff	 and	students			
80	 Mean	 age	benign	grp	=	34.9	 (13.3)	vs.	 control	grp	 =	 36.4	(13.8)	
NR	
Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	&	 Mathews	(2010)	
N	 =	 40	 GAD	patients		 77.5	 Mean	 age	benign	grp	=	43	 (13.6)	vs.	41	(9.3)	 in	 the	control	grp		
NR	
Attentional	bias	papers		Krebs,	Hirsch,	&	 Mathews	(2010)	 N	=	64	Students	scoring	 ≤	 55	 69	 Whole	sample	 =		23.78	(4.95)	 NR	
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70.73	 Training	condition	 =	19.3	(1.1)	Control	condition	 =	19.85	(2.1)	
70%	 =	Caucasian		7%	 =	African	American		7%	=	Asian	or	 Pacific	Islander	13%	 =	other		
Attentional	control	paper		Rapee	(1993)		 N	=	68	Students:	self-reported	 high	and	 low	worriers		
High	worry	grp	 =	80		Low	worry	grp	 =	50			
High	 worry	grp	=	19	(SD	2.4)		Non-worry	grp	 =	 21.4	SD	(5.4)		
NR	
Verbal/Imagery	papers		Stokes	 &	Hirsch	 N	=	60	Staff	 &	 88.33	 Verbal	 grp	 =	26.83	 NR	
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						Note:	IB	=	Interpretation	bias;	AB	=	Attention	bias;	AC	=	Attentional	control;	V/I	 =	 Verbal/Imagery;	 IU	 =	 Intolerance	 of	 uncertainty;	WSR	 =	Worry	 stop	rules;	PSWQ	=	Penn	State	Worry	Questionnaire;	Tht	=	Threat;	Neu	–	Neutral;	Grp	=	Group;	NR	=	Not	reported			 The	study	that	required	a	GAD	population	(Hayes	et	al.,	2010)	used	the	structured	clinical	interview	for	the	DSM	(SCID;	First,	Spitzer,	Gibbon,	&	Williams,	1997)	 to	 confirm	a	diagnosis	of	GAD.	The	PSWQ	




70%	female	 Negative	verbal	 =		33.30	(9.76)	Negative	imagery		31.75	(8.85)	Positive	verbal	=	 	 32.80	(12.61)	Positive	imagery	 =		33.10	(9.85)	
NR	
Intolerance	of	uncertainty	papers		Ladouceur,	Gosselin,	 	 &	Dugas	(2000)	 N	=	42	Students	 71.43	 22.75	(4.50)		 NR	Meeten,	Dash,	Scarlett,	 &	Davey	(2012)	 N	=	46	Students		 71.74	 Range	 =	 19-47		Mean	 =	 26.8		(5.52).		
NR	
Goal	directed	worry	stop	rule	and	negative	mood	papers		Startup	 &	Davey	 (2001)	Exp	3	 N	=	40	Students	 NR		 NR	 NR	Meeten	 &	Davey	(2011)	 N	=	150	University	students	 and	staff		
74	 Range	 =	 18-42		Mean	 =	21.91	(4.25)		
NR					
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(Meyer	et	al.	1990)	was	used	in	all	studies	that	screened	participants	as	high	or	non-high	trait	worriers.	Studies	varied	on	how	they	used	the	PSWQ	 to	 define	 high	 worriers.	 Three	 studies	 (Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 &	Mathews,	2010;	Hirsch	et	al.	2009;	Hirsch,	et	al.	2015)	employed	a	cut-off	score	of	≥	56	on	the	PSWQ.	Sass	et	al.	(2017)	used	≥	62	as	a	cut-off	for	 their	 high	worry	 group	 at	 the	 screening	phase,	 but	 reported	 that	the	mean	PSWQ	score	of	those	who	agreed	to	take	part	after	screening	was	 54.7,	 thus	 lower	 than	 their	 intended	 cut-off.	 Rapee	 (1993)	recruited	 participants	 who	 considered	 themselves	 to	 be	 worriers	 or	non-worriers.	The	lowest	mean	PSWQ	score	of	the	worriers	group	was	63.7.	 Where	 studies	 specified	 a	 non-high	 trait	 worry	 population	(Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Krebs	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 the	 PSWQ	 cut-off	 score	 was	≤55.		 The	 mean	 age	 of	 the	 GAD	 group	 was	 42	 (11.45)	 years,	 the	average	of	the	mean	ages	of	the	high	trait	worry	participants	across	all	studies	was	 26.56	 (7.64)	 and	 the	 average	mean	 age	 of	 the	 non-high	worry	groups	across	all	studies	was	21.64	(3.83)	and	mean	age	in	the	non-screened	 groups	 (one	 study	 in	 this	 category	 did	 not	 report	participant	ages)	was	23.82	(4.85).	The	gender	distribution	in	the	GAD	group	was	80%	female.	The	average	gender	distribution	across	all	the	high	worry	sample	was	78.34%	female,	in	the	non-high	worry	groups	it	was	61.67%	female	and	 in	 the	non-screened	groups	 it	was	72.39%	female,	 with	 one	 study	 in	 this	 category	 not	 reporting	 gender	distribution.	 One	 of	 the	 studies	 in	 this	 review	 reported	 participant	ethnicity	 (Sass	 et	 al.,	 2017;	 see	 Table	 1	 for	 age	 and	 gender	 of	participants	in	each	experiment).			Table	2	Systematic	review	findings		Study			 SampleGAD	 or	non-clinical	













NC	 n	 =	 16	 in	each	condition	i)Tht	training/exp-licit	instruction		ii)Tht	training/sta-ndard	instruction		iii)Neu	training/	explicit	instruction		iv)	 Neu	training/sta-ndard	instruction		





Worry	breathi-ng	focus	 Y	 17				Hirsch,	MacLeod	Mathews	Sandher,	Siyani,	 &	Hayes	(2011)	
NC	 n	 =	 16	 in	each	condition	i)	 encourage	selective	engagement	[with	 threat	meanings]		ii)	discourage	




NC	 Attention	training	condition	 n	=	20	Control	condition	 n	=	21		
Modified	 dot	probe	task		 PSWQ	scores		 Y	 15	
Attentional	control	paper		Rapee	(1993)		 	 n	 =	 50	 high	worriers	Task	 1	 n	 =	13	Task	 1	 n	 =	11	Task	 1	 n	 =	13	Task	 1	 n	 =	13		n	=	18	low		worriers	Task	1	n	=	4	Task	1	n	=	5	Task	1	n	=	5	Task	1	n	=	4	
4	tasks	that	used	different	 aspects	of	AC	i)	 Phonological	loop	(n	=	17)	ii)	 Phonological	loop	 &	 central	executive	 (n	 =	16)	iii)	 Visuospatial	sketchpad	 (n	 =	18)	iv)	 Visuospatial	sketchpad	 &	central	 executive	(n	=	17)	
Worry	about	current	worry	topic		Frequenc-y	 of	worry	related	thoughts	in	 worry	alone	 vs.	worry	with	AC		
Y	 16	
Verbal/Imagery	papers	Stokes	 &	Hirsch	(2010)	 NC	 Imagery	training	 grp	n	=	30	Verbal		training	 grp	
n	=	30	
Training	 to	worry	 verbally	or	using	imagery	 Worry	breathing	focus	task	
Y	 17	




n	 =	 	 20	Positive	verbal	training	 n	 =		20	Positive	imagery	training	 	n	=		20	
about	 scenarios	using	 images	 or	verbally	 breathing	focus	task	
Intolerance	of	uncertainty	papers	Ladouce-ur,	Gosselin,		&	 Dugas	(2000)	
NC	 Raised	 IU	induction	 n	=	21		Lowered	 IU	induction	 n	=	21	
Computerised	Roulette	 game	with	 incentive	 to	win	money	 for	 a	charity.	Certainty	 about	whether	 charity	would	 get	 its	money	 was	manipulated		
Modified	PSWQ	questions		 Y	 14	
Meeten,	Dash,	Scarlett,	&	 Davey	(2012)	
NC	 Raised	 IU	induction	 n	=	25		Lowered	 IU	induction	 n	=	21	




NC	 AMA	 SR	 n	 =	20	FL	SR	n	=	20		After	 tertile	split	 on	PSWQ:	
Worry	 stop	 rule	manipulation	instructions	 Worry	catastrop-hising	task	
Y	 16	
	 29	
HW/AMA	 n	=	7	HW/FL	 n	 =	7	LW	 /AMA	 n	=	6	LW/FL	n	=	8	Meeten	&	 Davey	(2011)	 NC	 n	 	=	15	each	grp	AMA	Neg	AMA	Anx	AMA	Ang	AMA	Pos	AMA	Neu	FL	Neg	FL	Anx	FL	Ang	FL	Pos	FL	Neu	
Worry	 stop	 rule	manipulation	instructions		+	Mood	 induction	using	film	
Worry	catastrop-hising	task	
Y	 17	
	Note:	IB	=	Interpretation	bias;	AB	=	Attention	bias;	AC	=	Attentional	control;	V/I	 =	 Verbal/Imagery;	 IU	 =	 Intolerance	 of	 uncertainty;	WSR	 =	Worry	 stop	rules;	PSWQ	=	Penn	State	Worry	Questionnaire;	Tht	=	Threat;	Neu	–	Neutral;	Grp	=	Group;	NR	=	Not	reported;	GAD	=	Generalised	anxiety	disorder;	NC	=	Non	clinical;	Y	=	Yes;	N	=	No:	AMA	=	‘As	many	as	can’	stop	rule;	FL	=	‘Feel	like’	stop	rule;	HW	=	High	worry;	LW	=	Low	worry		4.3	Paradigms	used	to	manipulate	cognitive	constructs		 The	 experiments	 discussed	 in	 this	 review	 used	 a	 number	 of	experimental	 paradigms	 to	 manipulate	 the	 cognitive	 construct	 of	interest	(see	Table	2	for	an	overview	of	manipulation	methods).	These	will	 be	 discussed	 here	 along	 with	 an	 examination	 of	 whether	 the	experiments	 included	 a	 check	 on	 whether	 the	 manipulation	 of	 the	construct	was	successful.		
4.3.1	Interpretation	bias		Interpretation	 bias	 was	 manipulated	 in	 two	 studies	 (Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	et	al.,	2010;	Hirsch	et	al.,	2009)	by	using	a	homograph	task	and	an	ambiguous	scenarios	 task.	The	homograph	 task	presents	word	pairs	(devised	by	Grey	and	Mathews,	2000)	where	the	cue	word	is	 a	 homograph	with	 a	 threat	 or	 benign	meaning	 e.g.	 ‘beat’	 which	 is	then	paired	with	a	disambiguating	word	fragment	e.g.	beat	–	mu_ic	or	
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beat	 –	 fi_ht.	 Depending	 on	 the	 training	 condition	 a	 participant	 is	assigned	to,	they	will	either	see	all	threat	or	all	benign	associated	word	fragments	 and	 participants	 are	 instructed	 to	 press	 a	 key	 as	 soon	 as	they	know	what	 the	word	 in	 the	word	 fragment	 is	and	 then	 they	are	prompted	to	fill	in	the	corresponding	missing	letter.	In	order	to	assess	training	effects,	 (Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	et	al.,	2010)	also	presented	20	test	trials	after	training	where	the	disambiguating	word	fragment	was	50%	threat	and	50%	benign	and	 the	 time	 taken	 to	 indicate	 that	 they	knew	what	the	word	was,	was	a	measure	of	interpretation	and	thus	a	manipulation	 check.	 The	 ambiguous	 scenarios	 task	 presents	 the	participant	with	up	to	90	audio	recorded	scenarios	that	cover	a	range	of	worry	 topics	 and	 the	 scenario	 is	 emotionally	 ambiguous	 until	 the	final	 word,	 which	 disambiguates	 the	 scenario.	 The	 participant	 then	sees	 a	 comprehension	question	on	 the	 computer	 screen.	An	 example	scenario	 from	 Hirsch	 et	 al.	 (2009,	 p.	 46)	 where	 the	 final	disambiguating	work	 is	 in	 parentheses	 is	 “You	 are	 given	 the	 task	 of	arranging	the	annual	office	party.	Despite	having	very	 little	 time,	you	do	 your	 best	 to	 prepare	 food,	 drink	 and	 entertainment.	 As	 the	 night	approaches,	 you	 think	 that	 the	 event	will	 be	 a	 (success/disaster).”	 A	comprehension	 question	 then	 checks	 that	 the	 participant	 has	understood	 the	 scenario	 in	 the	 appropriate	 context	 e.g.	 “Did	 people	enjoy	 the	 party	 you	 planned?”	 yes/no.	 	 Assessment	 of	 change	 in	interpretation	bias	in	the	ambiguous	scenarios	task	is	measured	in	the	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	et	al.,	2010)	paper	by	a	small	number	(20/90)	of	test	 trials	where	 the	 scenario	 presented	 remains	 ambiguous	 and	 the	yes/no	 response	 to	 the	 comprehension	 question	 indicates	 the	interpretation	 valence.	 Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 Krebs,	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 reported	that	there	was	no	expected	effect	of	training	group	on	the	homograph	test	trial	latencies,	raising	the	question	as	to	whether	the	manipulation	was	successful	using	this	task.	There	was	a	significant	effect	of	training	group	 on	 the	 test	 trials	 for	 the	 ambiguous	 scenarios	 task	where	 the	benign	group	made	significantly	more	benign	interpretations	than	the	control	 group.	This	was	 further	qualified	by	 finding	 that	 the	 training	
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effect	transferred	onto	a	sentence	completion	task	where	participants	were	provided	with	a	sentence	that	remained	ambiguous	until	the	final	word.	 Participants	 were	 asked	 to	 generate	 as	 many	 one	 word	completions	as	possible	to	each	sentence,	in	the	order	that	they	came	to	 mind.	 The	 benign	 training	 group	 generated	 proportionally	 fewer	negative	completions	than	the	control	group	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	et	al.,	 2010).	 These	 finding	 suggests	 that	 the	 ambiguous	 scenarios	training	task	was	successful	at	manipulating	interpretation	bias	in	the	required	direction.		
4.3.2	Attention	bias		 Attentional	 bias	 was	 manipulated	 by	 using	 a	 modified	 dot-probe	task	in	two	experiments	(Krebs	et	al.,	2010;	Sass	et	al.	2017)	and	one	experiment	also	employed	both	the	dot	probe	task	and	a	dichotic	listening	task	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	&	Mathews,	2010).	The	dichotic	listening	task	 (Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 &	 Mathews,	 2010)	 used	 10	 worry	 related	scenarios	 and	 10	 benign	 scenarios	 that	 were	 presented	 at	 the	 same	time	 with	 one	 benign	 and	 one	 worry	 scenarios	 presented	simultaneously	over	2	minutes.	Participants	were	informed	of	the	title	of	 the	 text	 to	 follow	 and	 which	 ear	 it	 would	 begin	 in.	 The	 texts	switched	 ears	 during	 each	 scenario	 to	 encourage	 tracking	 and	participants	completed	comprehension	questions	relating	to	the	story	they	were	asked	to	track	at	 the	end	of	each	presentation.	The	benign	training	 group	 were	 asked	 to	 track	 benign	 texts	 and	 the	 control	training	 group	 tracked	 benign	 texts	 and	 worry-related	 texts	 50%	 of	the	 time	 for	 each	 type	 in	 counterbalanced	 order.	 Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 and	Mathews	(2010)	found	that	accuracy	for	the	comprehension	questions	in	the	dichotic	listening	task	was	significantly	higher	in	the	control	as	compared	 to	 the	 benign	 group.	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	 high	worriers	naturally	attend	to	worry-related	material	as	opposed	to	benign	topics	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	&	Mathews,	2010).		As	 described	 in	Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 and	Mathews	 (2010),	 a	 typical	dot-probe	 task	 to	 train	 individuals	 to	 benign	 stimuli	 will	 show	 the	
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participant	 a	 threat	 –	 non-threat	 word	 pair	 and	 after	 a	 750ms	 one	word	is	replaced	by	a	target	(a	dot)	and	the	participant	has	to	press	a	button	when	the	target	appears.	 In	order	 to	 train	attention	to	benign	information,	the	target	is	consistently	in	the	location	of	the	non-threat	word.	 To	 assess	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	manipulation	 Hayes,	 Hirsch	and	Mathews	(2010)	and	Krebs	et	al.	(2010)	included	eight	test	trials	within	 the	 training	 trials	 where	 four	 targets	 appeared	 in	 the	 threat	word	location	and	four	 in	the	neutral	word	location	regardless	of	the	training	 group.	 The	 response	 latency	 to	 locate	 the	 target	 was	 the	measure	 of	 attentional	 bias.	 In	 both	 studies	 there	 was	 an	 effect	 of	training	on	response	latencies	in	the	expected	direction	based	on	type	of	 training	 received.	 Sass	et	 al.	 (2017)	also	employed	a	manipulation	assessment	measure	 by	 using	 a	 dot	 probe	 task	 to	 assess	 attentional	bias	before	and	after	a	manipulation	phase.	They	were	able	to	report	that	the	manipulation	was	successful.	Hirsch	et	al.	(2011)	used	a	novel	attention	training	task	to	train	participants	to	selectively	engage	with	benign	 information	 or	 disengage	 from	 threat	 meanings.	 The	manipulation	was	designed	to	either	focus	on	attentional	engagement	with	 the	 meaning	 of	 threat	 or	 non-threat	 words	 (depending	 on	allocation	 to	 condition	 of	 increase	 of	 decrease	 threat	 processing)	 or	with	the	attentional	disengagement	from	threat	or	non	threat	words.	A	manipulation	 check	 suggested	 that	 the	 training	 was	 successful	 in	inducing	 a	 group	 difference	 in	 attentional	 bias	 through	 selective	engagement	with	 and	 selective	disengagement	 from	 threat	meanings	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2011).		
4.3.3	Attentional	control	Rapee	(1993)	used	four	different	tasks	to	examine	the	effect	of	attentional	 control	 on	 worry.	 The	 tasks	 were	 employed	 to	 examine	different	 aspects	 of	 working	 memory	 and	 were	 described	 by	 Rapee	(1993)	 as	 follows.	 To	 employ	 the	 phonological	 loop,	 the	 first	 task	required	participants	to	say	the	word	‘one’	at	approximately	1	second	intervals.	 The	 second	 task	 employed	 both	 the	 phonological	 loop	 and	
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the	 component	 of	 the	 central	 executive	 concerned	 with	 the	phonological	loop	required	participants	to	generate	random	letters	of	the	 alphabet	 at	 approximately	 one	 second	 intervals.	 The	 third	 task	utilised	 the	 visuo-spatial	 sketchpad	 required	 participants	 to	 touch	keys	on	a	9-button	key	pad	in	the	shape	of	an	S.	Finally,	the	fourth	task	examined	use	of	the	visuo-spatial	sketchpad	and	the	component	of	the	central	executive	relating	to	the	visuo-spatial	sketchpad	and	required	participants	to	randomly	touch	keys	on	a	keypad.	 	To	assess	whether	participants	were	able	to	complete	each	task	adequately,	Rapee	(1993)	compared	 the	 mean	 time	 between	 responses	 on	 a	 participant’s	designated	task	and	the	evenness	of	responses	when	they	were	doing	the	 task	 alone	 (baseline	 phase)	 and	 while	 doing	 the	 task	 when	worrying,	 for	 each	 task.	 Using	 a	 repeated	measures	 ANOVA	with	 all	tasks	 assessed	 in	 the	 ANOVA,	 Rapee	 (1993)	 reported	 a	 significant	effect	 of	 task	 as	 one	would	 expect,	 but	no	 interaction	 effect	 between	task	 and	 worry	 phase.	 This	 suggests	 that	 participants	 were	 able	 to	adequately	complete	the	task	while	not	worrying	and	while	worrying.			
4.3.4	Mentation	style:	Verbal	vs.	Imagery		Stokes	 and	 Hirsch	 (2010)	 manipulated	 processing	 style	 by	training	 participants	 to	 worry	 while	 using	 a	 verbal	 or	 an	 imagery	processing	style.	Participants	in	the	imagery	condition	were	trained	by	asking	them	to	imagine	completing	familiar	scenarios	and	engaging	in	all	 their	 senses	 (e.g.	 see,	 smell,	 taste,	 hear)	 to	 heighten	 the	 image.	Participants	 in	 the	 verbal	 condition	were	 asked	 to	 think	 about	 every	day	 scenarios,	 but	 as	 though	 they	 were	 talking	 to	 themselves.	Participants	 then	 used	 these	 different	 information	 processing	 styles	while	worrying	about	a	personal	worry	topic	for	5	minutes,	where	the	dependent	 variable	 was	 number	 of	 negative	 thought	 intrusions	recorded	 in	 a	 breathing	 focus	 task	 before	 and	 after	 the	word	 period	(see	Appendix	2	for	further	details	on	the	worry	breathing	focus	task).	As	a	manipulation	check,	Stokes	and	Hirsch	(2010)	asked	participants	to	 complete	 two	visual	 analogue	 scales	 assessing	what	percentage	of	
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the	 time	 the	 participants	 thought	 they	 had	 engaged	 in	 verbal	processing	 and	 imagery	 during	 the	 worry	 phase.	 Only	 those	 who	scored	 above	 55%	 in	 their	 designated	mentation	 condition	 and	 that	this	 was	 also	 at	 least	 10%	 greater	 than	 their	 score	 on	 the	 other	mentation	 style	 were	 included	 in	 the	 analysis.	 Hirsch	 et	 al.	 (2015)	trained	 participants	 to	 think	 about	 positive	 or	 negative	 outcomes	 to	scenarios	 in	 either	words	or	 images.	 Participants	were	 first	 asked	 to	think	about	a	common	concept	 ‘friendship’	 in	either	words	or	images	and	 were	 then	 provided	 with	 scenarios	 which	 were	 potentially	worrying	and	were	asked	to	think	about	positive	or	negative	outcomes	(depending	 on	 condition	 allocation).	 The	 amount	 of	 time	 spent	thinking	 about	 each	 scenario	 was	 progressively	 increased.	 	 As	 a	manipulation	 check,	participants	 rated	 their	 thinking	 style	 after	 each	scenario.			
4.3.5	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	(IU)	Two	 experiments	 manipulated	 IU	 (Ladouceur	 et	 al.,	 2000;	Meeten	et	al.,	2012).	Ladouceur	et	al.	(2000)	used	a	Roulette	game	to	manipulate	 IU.	 Participants	 were	 informed	 that	 money	 would	 be	donated	 to	 a	 fictitious	 charity	 if	 the	participant	 finished	 the	Roulette	game	with	money	over	a	certain	 limit.	Participants	 in	 the	 increase	 IU	group	 were	 informed	 that	 their	 chances	 of	 winning	 were	 low,	 the	implication	 being	 that	 the	 charity	would	 get	 no	money.	 Those	 in	 the	decrease	IU	group	were	informed	that	the	chance	of	winning	was	high	and	 whatever	 the	 outcome,	 the	 charity	 would	 receive	 their	 money,	thus	 reducing	uncertainty	 about	whether	 the	 charity	would	 gain	 any	money.	In	order	to	evaluate	the	manipulation,	participants	responded	to	 six	 questions	 to	 evaluate	 IU	 about	 the	 experimental	 task.	 These	questions	 were	 based	 on	 the	 Intolerance	 of	 Uncertainty	 Scale	(Freeston,	Rheaume,	Letarte,	Dugas,	&	Ladouceur,	1994).	Meeten	et	al.	(2012)	 used	 an	 IU	 manipulation	 technique	 based	 on	 work	 by	 Kelly,	(2009)	 whereby	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 read	 a	 story	 where	 the	central	 character	 is	 in	 a	 situation	 with	 low	 or	 high	 IU.	 Participants	
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were	 asked	 to	 imagine	 themselves	 in	 the	 story,	 and	 stories	 were	gender	congruent	in	order	to	facilitate	assimilation	with	the	character.	Participants	were	 then	asked	 to	 think	of	 a	 situation	 in	 their	 own	 life	where	they	were	unsure	whether	the	outcome	would	be	good	or	bad	and	 then	 they	were	 required	 to	write	 a	 diary	 entry	 as	 the	 character	with	high	or	low	IU	about	the	personal	uncertain	event	that	they	had	just	described.		To	assess	efficacy	of	the	manipulation,	a	manipulation	check	was	 employed	which	was	 in	 the	 form	of	 three	visual	 analogue	questions,	 which	 assessed	 beliefs	 about	 uncertainty	 and	 its	implications.	 These	 questions	 were	 significantly	 correlated	 with	 the	Intolerance	 of	 Uncertainty	 scale	 Short	 form	 (Carleton,	 Norton,	 &	Asmundson,	2007).	
4.3.6	Goal	directed	worry	stop	rules		Two	 experiments	manipulated	 goal	 directed	worry	 stop	 rules	(Meeten	&	Davey,	2012;	 Startup	&	Davey,	2001)	by	providing	verbal	and	 written	 instructions	 asking	 participants	 to	 complete	 a	 worry	catastrophising	task	by	using	one	of	two	rules.	Those	 in	the	 ‘as	many	as	 can’	 stop	 rule	 condition	were	asked	 to	 “take	part	 in	 the	 interview	until	they	had	reached	their	goal	of	sufficiently	exploring	their	worry”.	Those	in	the	‘feel	like	continuing’	condition	were	asked	to	take	part	in	the	 interview	as	 long	 as	 they	 felt	 like	 continuing	with	 the	 interview”	(Startup	&	Davey,	2001,	p.	91).	In	the	Meeten	and	Davey	(2012)	study,	participants	 were	 asked	 to	 confirm	 that	 they	 had	 understood	 the	instructions.	Neither	study	performed	a	manipulation	check.	4.4	How	is	worry	assessed	in	the	laboratory?	Employing	 valid	 and	 reliable	 ways	 to	 measure	 worry	 in	 the	laboratory	is	crucial	to	better	understanding	the	cognitive	antecedents	of	 worry.	 In	 seven	 experiments	 (Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 Krebs	 et	 al.	 2010;	Hayes,	Hirsch,	&	Mathews,	2010;	Hirsch	et	al.,	2011,	2009;	Hirsch	et	al.,	2015;	Krebs	et	al.,	2010;	Stokes	&	Hirsch,	2010)	 the	worry	breathing	focus	task	is	used	as	an	outcome	measure.	This	task	is	adapted	from	a	behavioural	 measure	 of	 worry	 developed	 by	 Borkovec,	 Robinson,	
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Pruzinsky,	 and	 DePree	 (1983)	 and	 refined	 by	 Ruscio	 and	 Borkovec	(2004).	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 number	 of	 negative	 thought	intrusions	 that	 occur	 in	 a	 breathing	 focus	 period	 before	 and	 after	 a	worry	 period	 (see	 Appendix	 2	 for	 a	 full	 description	 of	 the	 worry	breathing	focus	task).		Three	 experiments	 employed	 the	 catastrophising	 interview	procedure	 as	 a	 behavioural	 measure	 of	 worry.	 This	 worry	 task	 was	modelled	on	an	 interview	designed	by	Vasey	&	Borkovec	 (1992)	and	modified	by	(Davey	&	Levy,	1998).	Here,	the	dependent	variable	is	the	number	 of	 responses	 generated	 in	 a	 catastrophising	 interview	 on	 a	personal	 worry	 topic	 (see	 Appendix	 3	 for	 a	 full	 description	 of	 the	catastrophising	 interview).	 Rapee	 (1993)	 assessed	 worry	 by	 asking	participants	 to	 think	 about	 a	 topic	 of	 current	 concern,	 which	 they	could	worry	about.	This	was	then	discussed	with	the	experimenter	to	remind	 the	 participant	 of	 the	 salient	 aspects	 of	 the	 worry	 and	participants	engaged	in	worry	using	this	topic	during	the	experiment.	Rapee	 (1993)	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 the	 validity	 of	 this	 technique	 as	 a	measure	 of	 worry.	 However,	 it	 is	 a	 technique	 now	 commonly	employed	as	a	measure	of	worry	(e.g.	Behar,	Zuellig,	&	Borkovec,	2005;	Llera	&	Newman,	2010).	One	experiment	(Sass	et	al.,	2017)	used	a	trait	measure	of	worry,	the	Penn	State	Worry	Questionnaire	(PSWQ;	Meyer	et	 al.,	 1990)	 as	 a	 means	 of	 measuring	 worry	 before	 and	 after	manipulation	of	 a	 clinical	 construct.	 This	 is	 a	 trait	measure	 of	worry	and	one	would	not	expect	a	relatively	brief	experimental	manipulation	to	affect	a	trait	worry	measure.	However,	it	should	be	highlighted	that	baseline	 PSWQ	 scores	 in	 the	 Sass	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 study	were	 from	 the	screening	 stage	 of	 the	 study,	 approximately	 30	 days	 prior	 to	 the	experiment.	 The	 PSWQ	 has	 good	 test-retest	 reliability	 (Molina	 &	Borkovec,	 1994),	 internal	 consistency	 (Brown,	 Antony,	 &	 Barlow,	1992)	and	discriminant	validity	(Meyer	et	al.,	1990).	One	experiment	(Ladouceur	et	al.,	2000)	used	three	questions	based	on	items	from	the	PSWQ	 (Meyer	 et	 al.	 1990),	 but	 modified	 to	 ask	 about	 participants	worry	 relevant	 to	 the	 IU	 manipulation.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 this	
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assessment	 of	 worry	 had	 been	 piloted	 and	 whether	 the	 3-item	measure	had	good	validity	and	reliability.		4.5	 What	 evidence	 is	 there	 for	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	cognitive	constructs	and	worry?	
4.5.1	Interpretation	bias		Two	 studies	 (Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 Krebs	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Hirsch	 et	 al.,	2009)	have	examined	the	effect	of	manipulating	interpretation	bias	on	worry.	Both	 experiments	used	 the	worry	breathing	 focus	 task	 as	 the	measure	 of	 worry.	 Homograph	 and	 ambiguous	 scenarios	 tasks	were	used	to	provide	either	benign	training	(non-threat	interpretations)	or	sham	training	(50/50	benign-	threat	interpretations)	with	a	high	trait	worry	sample	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2009).	There	was	a	significant	effect	(large	effect,	 ƒ2	 =	 0.63)	 of	 training	 on	 the	 number	 of	 negative	 thought	intrusions	 during	 the	 worry	 breathing	 focus	 task	 with	 the	 benign	training	 condition	 having	 significantly	 fewer	 intrusions	 than	 the	control	 group	 both	 before	 and	 after	 the	worry	 period	 (Hirsch	 et	 al.,	2009).	This	was	also	the	case	when	these	interpretation	bias	training	methods	were	 employed	with	participants	with	GAD,	 (Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs	et	al.,	2010)	where	there	was	also	a	large	effect	size	(ƒ2		=	0.43).		
4.5.2	Attentional	bias	Four	 experiments	 examined	 the	 effect	 of	 attentional	 bias	 on	worry	 and	 all	 reported	 a	 significant	 effect	 of	 bias	 training	 on	worry	task	 with	 a	 medium	 –	 large	 effect	 size.	 Hayes,	 Hirsch	 and	 Mathews	(2010)	used	a	dot	probe	task	and	a	dichotic	listening	task	to	train	high	trait	 worriers	 (56≥	 PSWQ)	 to	 attend	 to	 non-threatening	 words	 and	text	and	worry	related	stimuli.	A	control	condition	received	attention	training	 to	 benign	 and	 threat	 stimuli	 equally.	 Using	 the	 worry	breathing	 focus	 task	 as	 a	 laboratory	 proxy	 measure	 of	 worry,	 they	reported	 that	 negative	 intrusions	 increased	 significantly	 from	before	to	after	 the	worry	period	 in	 the	control	 training	group	(r	=	 .57,	 large	effect),	 but	 that	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 difference	 in	 the	 benign	
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training	 group	 (t	 =	 <1),	 suggesting	 that	 benign	 training	 was	 a	protective	factor	during	the	worry	task.		Hayes,	 Hirsch	 and	Mathews	 (2010)	 noted	 that	 a	 limitation	 of	their	 study	 design	 was	 that	 one	 could	 not	 differentiate	 the	contribution	 of	 the	 dot-probe	 task	 and	 dichotic	 listening	 task	 to	attention	 bias	 change.	 Krebs	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 examined	 the	 effects	 of	attention	bias	modification	on	negative	 thought	 intrusions	using	only	the	dot-probe	 task.	 Participants	were	non-high	 trait	worriers	 (PSWQ	≤55)	and	 a	 key	 difference	 between	 this	 study	 and	 the	 Hayes,	 Hirsch	and	Mathews	(2010) study	is	that	participants	were	trained	to	attend	to	either	threat	or	neutral	words.	The	authors	also	examined	the	effect	of	 giving	 explicit	 vs.	 standard	 instructions	 on	 the	 dot	 probe	 task.	Explicit	 instructions	 highlighted	 the	 relationship	 between	 word	valance	 and	 target	 location	 and	 usual	 instructions	 that	 did	 not	highlight	 this	 link.	 There	 was	 a	 significant	 effect	 of	 instruction	 type	whereby	the	explicit	instructions	led	to	greater	differences	in	attention	to	threat	words	vs.	neutral	 in	the	threat	group	(d	=	1.75,	 large	effect)	and	greater	differences	in	attention	to	neutral	vs.	threat	words	in	the	neutral	 groups	 (d	 =	 .88,	 large	 effect).	 Importantly,	 there	was	 also	 an	effect	 of	 training	 and	 instruction	 type	 on	 negative	 intrusions	 after	worry	 where	 those	 in	 the	 attention	 to	 threat	 condition	 had	 a	significantly	 greater	 number	 of	 negative	 intrusions	 after	 the	 worry	period,	but	this	effect	was	only	when	intrusion	valence	was	rated	by	an	independent	assessor	(d	=	1.20,	large	effect),	not	when	self-rated.		A	modified	dot	probe	task	was	also	used	by	Sass,	Evans,	Xiong,	Mirghassemi,	 and	Tran	 (2017)	 to	 examine	 the	 effect	 of	 training	 high	trait	worry	(PSWQ	≥54.7)	participants	to	attend	to	pleasant	stimuli	or	neutral	 stimuli.	 They	 found	 a	 significant	 effect	 of	 training	 on	 trait	worry	scores	where	there	was	a	significant	reduction	in	PSWQ	scores	from	 pre-post	 training	 in	 the	 group	 who	 were	 trained	 to	 attend	 to	pleasant	stimuli	 (ηp2			.257,	 large	effect).	There	was	no	change	 in	 trait	worry	scores	in	the	control	condition.	However,	baseline	PSWQ	scores	
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were	 those	 measured	 at	 the	 screening	 phase	 and	 there	 was	approximately	 30	 days	 between	 initial	 PSWQ	measure	 and	 post-task	PSWQ	measure.				 Hirsch	et	al.	(2011)	further	explored	the	role	of	attention	bias	in	worry	 by	 examining	 whether	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	attention	 bias	 and	 worry	 is	 driven	 by	 preferential	 engagement	 with	threat	 stimuli	 (at	 the	 cost	 of	 not	 attending	 to	 neutral	 or	 positive	stimuli)	 or	 difficulty	 disengaging	 from	 threat	 stimuli.	 Hirsch	 et	 al.	(2011)	trained	non-high	trait	worry	participants	(PSWQ	≤55)	to	either	increase	 or	 decrease	 threat	 processing	 (see	 above	 for	 discussion	 of	task).	 Hirsch	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 reported	 that	 the	 procedure	 designed	 to	encourage	 selective	 engagement	 with	 threat	 produced	 a	 greater	number	of	negative	thought	intrusions	than	the	procedure	designed	to	discourage	 selective	 engagement	with	 threat	 (d	 =	 1.14,	 large	 effect).	This	 would	 suggest	 that	 attentional	 bias	 drives	worry	 by	 facilitating	engagement	 with	 threat	 stimuli,	 rather	 than	 preventing	disengagement	with	threat	stimuli.		
4.5.3	Attentional	control	One	 study	 (Rapee,	 1993)	 examined	 attentional	 control	 where	the	 dependent	 variable	 was	 a	 measure	 of	 worry.	 Rapee	 (1993)	reported	that	a	task	(discussed	in	detail	above)	that	employed	both	the	central	 executive	 and	 phonological	 loop	 aspects	 of	 working	memory	was	 more	 effective	 in	 reducing	 number	 of	 worry	 thoughts	 (as	compared	 to	 the	worry	alone	period,	r	=	 .83,	 large	effect),	 than	 tasks	which	employed	only	the	phonological	 loop,	or	a	 task	which	uses	the	visuo-spatial	scratch	pad	and	the	phonological	loop	(Rapee,	1993).	The	implication	of	this	is	that	worry	uses	resources	in	the	central	executive	and	phonological	 loop	as	 tasks	using	 these	 resources	 reduced	worry.	There	were	no	significant	differences	between	high	and	low	worriers	on	 number	 of	 worry-related	 thoughts,	 although	 Rapee	 (1993)	highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 participant	 numbers	 in	 the	 low	worry	 group	were	low	(n	=	18).		
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4.5.4	Mentation	style:	Verbal	vs.	imagery	Two	 studies	 examined	 the	 effect	 of	modifying	mentation	 style	on	an	established	worry	task.	 	Stokes	and	Hirsch	(2010)	manipulated	mentation	 style	 by	 training	 participants	 to	 worry	 using	 imagery	 or	using	a	verbal	processing	style.	Using	 the	worry	breathing	 focus	 task	they	 found	 that	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 the	 number	 of	negative	intrusions	from	pre	to	post	worry	period	(f	=	.42,	large	effect),	with	the	verbal	mentation	style	condition	reporting	significantly	more	intrusions	than	the	 imagery	condition.	This	 finding	was	replicated	by	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2015)	who	found	that	 thinking	about	a	personal	worry	using	 negative	 imagery	 resulted	 in	 significantly	 fewer	 negative	intrusions	 in	 	 subsequent	 breathing	 focus	 period	 	 as	 compared	 to	negative	verbal	worry	(d	=	0.86,	large	effect).	
4.5.5	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	(IU)	Two	 studies	 examined	 the	 effect	 of	 experimentally	manipulating	IU	on	a	worry	task.	Ladouceur	et	al.	(2000)	manipulated	IU	 in	a	student	population	using	a	Roulette	game	scenario	(discussed	above).	 Worry	 was	 measured	 by	 a	 3-item	 assessment,	 which	 was	based	on	questions	from	the	PSWQ	(Meyer	et	al.,	1990),	but	modified	to	be	relevant	to	the	manipulation	task.	There	was	a	significant	effect	of	IU	manipulation	on	reported	worry	about	the	charity	(r	=	.66,	large	effect)	where	the	groups	with	increased	IU	reported	more	worry	about	the	charity	 than	the	 low	IU	group.	The	authors	highlight	a	critique	of	this	 study	 as	 being	 that	 the	 measures	 of	 IU	 and	 worry	 were	 only	relevant	to	the	gambling	task.	They	recommend	also	including	general	measures	of	IU	and	worry	in	future	research	(Ladouceur	et	al.,	2000).	Meeten	et	al.	(2012)	used	an	imagined	scenario	task	to	manipulate	IU.	The	 worry	 task	 was	 a	 catastrophising	 interview	 procedure	 (Davey,	2006b;	Vasey	&	Borkovec,	1992).	This	was	a	general	measure	of	worry	unrelated	 to	 the	 IU	 task,	 which	 overcomes	 the	 critique	 from	 the	Ladouceur	et	al.	(2000)	paper	that	the	worry	task	was	only	relevant	to	the	gambling	task.	Meeten	et	al.	(2012)	reported	that	those	in	the	high	
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IU	 manipulation	 produced	 significantly	 more	 steps	 on	 the	 worry	interview	than	those	in	the	low	IU	group	(r	=	.44,	medium	effect	size).	Meeten	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 further	 explored	 whether	 negative	 mood	 (self-reported	anxiety	 and	 sadness)	mediated	 the	 relationship	between	 IU	and	 worry	 catastrophising	 steps.	 However,	 meditational	 analyses	found	 that	 neither	 anxiety	 nor	 sadness	 ratings	 were	 significant	mediators.		
4.5.6	Metacognitions	in	pathological	worry	The	database	search	returned	one	experiment	that	examined	the	effect	of	negative	or	positive	beliefs	about	worry,	but	as	discussed	above,	 it	could	not	be	included	in	the	review.		
4.5.7	Goal	directed	worry	stop	rules		There	is	evidence	to	support	the	causal	role	of		‘as	many	as	can’	worry	 stop	 rules	 and	 negative	 mood	 in	 worry.	 Startup	 and	 Davey	(2001)	manipulated	worry	stop	rules	for	high	and	low	worriers.	High	worriers	 (who	 had	 significantly	 higher	 levels	 of	 negative	mood	 than	low	 worriers)	 and	 low	 worriers	 were	 asked	 to	 complete	 the	 worry	catastrophising	interview	either	while	using	an	‘as	many	as	can’	worry	stop	 rule	 (e.g.	 take	 part	 in	 the	 interview	 until	 you	 have	 reached	 the	goal	 of	 sufficiently	 exploring	 your	 worry)	 or	 while	 using	 a	 ‘feel	 like	stop	 rule	 (e.g.	 take	part	 in	 the	 interview	until	 you	no	 longer	 feel	 like	continuing).	 Interestingly	 there	was	a	significant	 interaction	between	stop	 rule	 and	 group	where	 high	worriers	 (in	 a	 low	mood)	 produced	significantly	more	catastrophising	steps	than	low	worriers	when	using	an	‘as	many	as	can	stop	rule	(r	=	0.63,	large	effect)	and	this	pattern	was	reversed	when	participants	were	using	a	 ‘feel	like’	stop	rule	with	low	worriers	 producing	 more	 catastrophising	 steps	 than	 high	 worriers	(although	 the	difference	did	not	 reach	 significance,	 r	 =	0.36,	medium	effect).	Startup	and	Davey	(2001)	argued	that	this	is	evidence	that	‘as	many	 as	 can’	 goal	 directed	 worry	 rules	 and	 negative	 mood	 have	 a	causal	influence	on	worry	perseveration.		 Meeten	and	Davey	(2012)	examined	the	effect	of	manipulating	
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worry	 stop	 rules	 in	 the	 context	 of	 different	 types	 of	 negative	mood.	They	used	film	clips	to	induce	participants	into	either	a	sad,	angry,	or	anxious	 mood	 and	 used	 a	 positive	 and	 neutral	 mood	 induction	 as	control	conditions.	Half	the	participants	were	then	asked	to	engage	in	the	worry	 catastrophising	 interview	while	 using	 an	 ‘as	many	 as	 can’	stop	rule	and	the	other	half	were	asked	to	use	a	 ‘feel	 like	continuing’	stop	rule.	Meeten	and	Davey	(2012)	found	that	participants	generated	significantly	 more	 catastrophising	 steps	 when	 using	 an	 ‘as	 many	 as	can’	 stop	 rule	and	 in	a	 sad	 (d	 =	0.80,	 large	effect),	 anxious	 (d	 =	0.87,	large	effect),	and	angry	(d	=	0.91,	large	effect),	mood	state	than	when	using	a	‘feel	like	continuing’	stop	rule.	In	contrast,	those	in	the	positive	condition	 generated	 significantly	 more	 catastrophising	 steps	 when	using	the	 ‘feel	 like	continuing’	stop	rule	(d	=	0.94,	 large	effect).	In	the	neutral	 mood	 condition	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 difference	 in	 the	number	 of	 steps	 generated	 by	 the	 two	 stop-rule	 conditions	 (d	 =	 .40,	small	effect).	These	finding	suggest	that	mood	and	stop	rule	interact	to	affect	catastrophising	steps	when	thinking	about	a	personally	relevant	worry	topic.	
4.5.8	Quality	of	studies	As	can	be	see	from	Table	2,	seven	of	the	thirteen	studies	were	scored	 as	 17/17.	 Four	 studies	 received	 a	 score	 of	 16.	 Reasons	 for	losing	a	point	were	that	potential	confounding	variable	such	as	age	and	gender	 of	 participants	 were	 not	 detailed	 (Startup	 &	 Davey,	 2001),	there	 was	 no	 reference	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 outcome	 measure	 was	 a	validated	or	established	measure	of	worry	 (Rapee,	1993),	a	potential	confounding	 variable	 were	 not	 equivalent	 at	 baseline	 (Meeten	 et	 al.	2012),	or	no	study	limitations	were	discussed	(Hirsch	et	al.	2011).	One	study	received	a	 score	of	15	 (Sass	et	al.	2017).	Two	points	were	 lost	due	to	baseline	measures	for	the	study	being	assessed	approximately	30	days	prior	 to	 the	 study	 and	 the	 conclusions	 attributing	 change	 in	PSWQ	 worry	 scores	 to	 the	 experimental	 manipulation	 without	reference	to	possible	other	confounding	variables.	The	Ladouceur	et	al.	
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(2000)	study	scored	14	on	the	quality	assessment	tool.	Key	difficulties	with	this	study	were	that	the	experimental	manipulation	appeared	to	manipulate	certainty	rather	than	intolerance	of	uncertainty.	There	was	also	 no	 baseline	 assessment	 of	 potential	 confounders	 and	 it	was	 not	clear	 that	 the	 worry	 measure	 was	 a	 reliable	 and	 valid	 means	 of	assessing	 state	worry.	 To	 improve	 validity	 of	 rating,	 a	 subsection	 (2	papers)	 of	 papers	 were	 chosen	 at	 random	 to	 be	 rated	 by	 a	 second	person.	There	was	94%	agreement	between	raters.		
5.	CONCLUSION		 The	 current	 systematic	 review	 discussed	 cognitive	 constructs	commonly	 associated	 with	 pathological	 worry	 and	 examined	experimental	evidence	for	the	causal	role	of	these	constructs	in	worry.	This	included	an	examination	of	the	methods	used	to	manipulate	these	cognitive	 constructs	 and	 the	methods	 used	 to	measure	worry	 in	 the	laboratory.			5.1	Overview	of	findings		This	 review	 examined	 the	 causal	 relationship	 of	 the	 following	cognitive	 constructs	 and	 worry:	 information	 processing	 biases	(interpretation	and	attentional	biases),	attentional	control,	mentation	style	 (verbal	 vs.	 imagery),	 positive	 and	negative	 beliefs	 about	worry,	intolerance	of	uncertainty,	and	goal	directed	worry	rules.	Evidence	for	a	 causal	 relationship	with	worry	was	 found	 for	 all	 constructs	 except	positive	and	negative	beliefs	about	worry.		
5.1.2	Cognitive	constructs	involved	in	the	initiation	of	worry	There	 is	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	information	 processing	 biases	 (interpretation	 and	 attention)	 and	measures	 of	 worry.	 Training	 participants	 (both	 high	 worriers	 and	those	 with	 GAD)	 to	 have	 a	 benign	 interpretation	 of	 ambiguous	scenarios	as	compared	to	a	sham	training	condition,	showed	those	 in	the	benign	training	group	to	have	reduced	negative	thought	intrusions	after	worry	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs	et	al.,	2010;	Hirsch	et	al.,	2009).	The	fact	 that	 the	 training	 effect	 with	 high	 worriers	 in	 the	 Hirsch	 et	 al.	
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(2009)	 study	was	 replicated	 in	 the	 study	with	 individuals	with	 GAD	(Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 Krebs	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 suggests	 it	 is	 a	 robust	 effect	 and	importantly,	an	effect	which	translates	to	a	clinical	population.		The	manipulation	of	attentional	bias	also	has	a	causal	effect	on	worry	 outcomes	 where	 high	 worriers	 have	 been	 trained	 to	 ignore	threat	 information	 (Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 &	 Mathews,	 2010),	 or	 attend	 to	pleasant	stimuli	(Sass	et	al.,	2017)	and	this	has	reduced	worry	related	negative	 intrusions,	relative	to	a	control	condition.	However,	 findings	from	the	Sass	et	al	(2017)	study	should	be	interpreted	with	caution	as	they	 measured	 worry	 at	 a	 screening	 session	 approximately	 30	 days	prior	to	the	study	and	then	after	the	attention	bias	manipulation.	Thus	the	 change	 in	PSWQ	scores	 cannot	be	 attributed	 to	 the	 experimental	manipulation	 alone.	 Training	 a	 non	 high	 trait	 worry	 population	 to	attend	 to	 threat	 (relative	 to	 a	 control	 condition)	 has	 also	 shown	 a	causal	 effect	 on	 negative	 intrusions	 (Krebs	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 and	manipulating	 engagement	 and	 disengagement	 from	 threat	 meanings	has	casually	influenced	negative	intrusions	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2011).		Only	one	study	was	included	in	the	review	when	examining	the	relationship	 between	 attentional	 control	 and	 worry	 (Rapee,	 1993).	Here	the	manipulation	of	different	aspects	of	working	memory	showed	that	 one	 task,	 which	 employed	 both	 the	 central	 executive	 and	phonological	 loop	 aspects	 of	 working	 memory	 reduced	 worry	 when	compared	 to	 worry	 when	 not	 performing	 the	 task.	 This	 review	 also	reported	 on	 two	 experiments	 (Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Stokes	 &	 Hirsch,	2010)	which	demonstrated	a	causal	relationship	between	the	normal,	verbal	nature	of	worry	(vs.	thinking	in	mental	imagery)	and	number	of	negative	intrusions	in	a	worry	breathing	focus	task.		
5.1.3	Beliefs	about	worry	The	present	review	examined	a	number	of	beliefs	about	worry	that	have	been	hypothesised	to	causally	influence	worry.	One	of	these	is	 the	 cognitive	 construct	 of	 intolerance	 of	 uncertainty	 (IU).	 The	 IU	model	proposes	 a	direct	 link	between	 intolerance	of	uncertainty	 and	
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worry	 (Dugas,	 Gosselin,	&	 Ladouceur,	 2001).	 The	 present	 systematic	review	discusses	two	experiments	(Ladouceur	et	al.,	2000;	Meeten	et	al.,	 2012)	 that	 used	 different	 techniques	 to	 increase	 and	 decrease	intolerance	 of	 uncertainty,	 observing	 that	 the	 raised	 intolerance	 of	uncertainty	group	reported	significantly	greater	levels	of	worry	on	the	two	 worry	 outcome	 measures	 than	 the	 decrease	 intolerance	 of	uncertainty	 group.	 Arguably,	 the	 construct	 manipulation	 in	 the	Ladouceur	et	al.	 (2000)	study	 lacked	specificity	and	 focused	more	on	the	 manipulation	 of	 certainty	 rather	 than	 intolerance	 of	 uncertainty	per	se.	Future	research	might	usefully	 focus	on	replicating	 this	effect	with	 a	 manipulation	 technique	 that	 is	 specific	 to	 intolerance	 on	uncertainty.	Meeten	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 extended	work	 by	 Ladouceur	 et	 al.	(2000)	by	showing	that	the	IU	manipulation	has	an	impact	on	a	worry	task	that	is	unrelated	to	the	IU	manipulation.			 Contrary	 to	Well’s	 metacognitive	model	 of	 GAD	 (Wells,	 1995,	2006),	there	was	no	evidence	to	support	a	causal	relationship	between	positive	or	negative	beliefs	about	worry	and	worry.	There	is	a	lack	of	good	quality	studies	examining	 this	purported	 link.	One	possibility	 is	that	 valid	 methods	 of	 experimentally	 manipulating	 negative	 beliefs	about	worry	have	not	yet	been	established.	Prados	(2011,	experiment	1)	attempted	to	manipulate	positive	and	negative	beliefs	about	worry	using	 persuasion	 messages.	 However,	 there	 was	 no	 manipulation	check,	 thus	 the	 efficacy	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 unknown.	 Research	 that	devises	a	method	of	manipulating	positive	and	negative	beliefs	about	worry	would	be	helpful	to	elucidate	whether	or	not	there	is	evidence	for	 a	 causal	 relationship.	 A	 second	 possibility	 is	 that	 positive	 and	negative	 beliefs	 about	 worry	 do	 not	 have	 a	 causal	 relationship	 with	worry.	 Although	 negative	 beliefs	 about	 worry	 are	 implied	 to	 have	 a	causal	 relationship	 with	 meta-worry	 in	 the	 metacognitive	 model	 of	GAD	 (Wells,	 1997,	 2006),	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 these	 types	 of	 beliefs	are	a	consequence	of	pathological	worry	rather	than	a	cause.		 There	was	 evidence	 to	 support	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	goal	directed	worry	rules	(‘as	many	as	can’	stop	rules)	in	conjunction	
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with	 negative	 mood	 and	 worry	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 catastrophising	interview	 (Davey,	 2006;	 Vasey	 &	 Borkovec,	 1992).	 Startup	 &	 Davey	(2001)	 found	 that	 high	 trait	 worriers	 (who	 were	 in	 a	 significantly	greater	 negative	 mood	 than	 low	 trait	 worriers)	 produced	 higher	numbers	of	catastrophising	steps	when	using	an	‘as	many	as	can’	stop	rule.	 This	 relationship	 between	 ‘as	 many	 as	 can’	 stop	 rule	 use	 and	negative	mood	and	its	effect	on	worry	perseveration	was	replicated	in	the	study	by	Meeten	&	Davey	(2012).		5.2	Impact	of	the	review	findings	on	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	cognitive	constructs	in	the	initiation	and	perseveration	of	worry		 Perhaps	 the	 most	 surprising	 finding	 from	 this	 review	 is	 the	relative	paucity	of	studies	examining	the	causal	relationship	between	cognitive	constructs	and	worry.	The	number	of	articles	returned	from	the	literature	search	was	small	(N	=	13),	arguably	providing	a	limited	evidence	 base	 for	 some	 of	 these	 cognitive	 constructs,	 despite	 their	prominence	 in	 theories	 of	 pathological	 worry.	 Where	 only	 one	experiment	 has	 been	 found	 to	 support	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	cognitive	constructs	and	worry,	replication	studies	are	warranted.		Considering	 first	 factors	 that	are	 thought	 to	have	a	 role	 in	 the	initiation	 of	 worry	 (e.g.	 Davey	 &	 Meeten,	 2016;	 Hirsch	 &	 Mathews,	2012)	 the	 relationship	between	 interpretation	 and	attentional	 biases	is	supported	and	research	evidence	 is	of	good	quality	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs	et	al.	2010;	Hayes,	Hirsch,	&	Mathews,	2010;		Hirsch	et	al.,	2009;	Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Krebs	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 although	 there	 are	 some	limitations	 associated	 with	 the	 Sass	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 study	 (discussed	above).	As	well	as	being	causally	related	to	worry,	it	is	likely	that	these	information	 processing	 biases	 interact	 with	 each	 other	 and	 also	maintain	 worry.	 This	 proposed	 interaction	 is	 called	 the	 combined	cognitive	 bias	 hypothesis	 (Hirsch,	 Clark,	 &	Mathews,	 2006;	 Hirsch	&	Mathews,	 2012).	 Hayes	 and	 Hirsch	 (2007)	 suggest	 that	 attention	 to	threat	could	be	captured	by	a	cue	in	the	environment	and	once	threat	representations	 are	 activated,	 an	 individual	 with	 pathological	 worry	
	 47	
may	 interpret	 emotionally	 ambiguous	 information	 in	 a	 threatening	manner,	 which	 in	 turn	 increases	 threat	 perception	 and	 so	 the	 cycle	may	continue,	resulting	 in	a	 full-blown	worry	episode.	This	proposed	interplay	between	attention	and	interpretation	biases	is	supported	by	research	which	demonstrated	that	training	individuals	to	have	biased	attention	 toward	 threat	 was	 linked	 to	 subsequent	 negative	interpretation	 of	 ambiguity	 (White,	 Suway,	 Pine,	 Bar-Haim,	 &	 Fox,	2011).	 Hirsch	 &	 Mathews	 (2012)	 suggest	 that	 as	 these	 ways	 of	thinking	 become	more	 engrained,	 cognitive	 biases	will	 also	maintain	worry	 by	 interacting	 with	 the	 content	 of	 a	 worry	 bout.	 Further	research	 is	 this	area	will	help	to	elucidate	the	dynamic	 integration	of	these	biases	with	each	other	and	with	worry	symptoms.			As	discussed	above,	only	one	study	(Rapee,	1993)	has	provided	evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 causal	 relationship	 between	 attentional	control	and	worry.	Extant	research	suggests	that	poor	trait	attentional	control	is	a	risk	factor	for	pathological	worry	(e.g.	Wessel	et	al.,	2008),	but	that	worry	also	has	a	deleterious	effect	on	attentional	control	(e.g.	Hayes	et	al.	2008;	Leigh	&	Hirsch,	2011).	One	possibility	is	that	there	is	a	 bi-directional	 relationship	 between	 attentional	 control	 and	 worry.	Individuals	who	have	 low	trait	attentional	control	may	have	 less	top-down	 resources	 to	 manage	 and	 dismiss	 perceived	 threats,	 which	 in	turn	 leads	 to	 initiation	 of	worry.	 Equally,	 once	worry	 has	 begun,	 the	worry	 process	 depletes	 attentional	 control	 resources,	 thus	making	 it	hard	to	disengage	from	a	worry	bout.		The	final	construct	examined	as	relating	to	initiation	of	worry	is	mentation	 style.	 Evidence	 from	 this	 review	 confirmed	 that	 verbal	processing	 (as	 opposed	 to	 imagery	 based	 processing)	 is	 causally	related	 to	worry	 (Hirsch	et	al.,	2012;	Stokes	&	Hirsch,	2010)	and	 the	evidence	 is	 of	 good	 quality.	 This	 finding	 supports	 the	 view	 that	engaging	 in	 verbal	 processing	 once	 a	 threat	 has	 been	 perceived	 is	more	 likely	 to	 result	 in	worry	 than	 thinking	 about	 that	 threat	 using	imagery.	Verbal	worry	(as	opposed	to	the	use	of	images)	has	also	been	linked	to	greater	attentional	bias	to	threat	(Williams	et	al.,	2014).	One	
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possibility	 is	 that	while	 there	 is	a	 causal	 relationship	between	verbal	worry	and	number	of	negative	intrusions	in	the	worry	breathing	focus	task,	once	a	worry	bout	commences	 this	serves	 to	augment	attention	to	threat	cues,	which	in	turn	will	provide	access	to	more	threat	stimuli,	thereby	keeping	the	worry	bout	alive.			Evidence	examining	maladaptive	beliefs	and	 their	 relationship	with	worry	(discussed	here	as	possible	drivers	of	worry	perseveration	after	 threat	 perception	 and	 worry	 initiation)	 is	 mixed.	 Once	 threat	activation	has	occurred	there	are	a	number	of	beliefs	and	responses	to	worry	 that	 pathological	 worriers	 are	 thought	 to	 hold	 and	 may	differentiate	chronic	and	pathological	worry	 from	normal	worry.	One	of	these	is	the	cognitive	construct	of	intolerance	of	uncertainty	(IU).	IU	is	proposed	 to	 influence	worry	directly	 and	also	 through	 three	other	processes,	 namely	 positive	 beliefs	 about	 worry,	 negative	 problem	orientation	 and	 cognitive	 avoidance	 (Koerner	 &	 Dugas,	 2006).	 The	present	 review	 examined	 two	 studies	 that	 assessed	 the	 causal	relationship	between	IU	and	worry.	Both	 the	Ladouceur	et	al.	 (2000)	and	 Meeten	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 studies	 found	 support	 for	 the	 causal	relationship	 between	 IU	 and	 worry.	 However	 the	 Ladouceur	 et	 al.,	(2000)	 study	 had	 some	 notable	 methodological	 issues	 (discussed	above).	 Goal	 directed	 worry	 stop	 rules	 in	 conjunction	 with	 negative	mood	 were	 also	 found	 to	 be	 causally	 related	 to	 worry	 (Meeten	 &	Davey,	2012;	Startup	&	Davey,	2001).	However,	both	mood	and	worry	stop	rule	was	only	manipulated	in	one	study	(Meeten	&	Davey,	2012)	with	 the	 Startup	 &	 Davey	 study	 experimentally	 manipulating	 stop	rules	in	high	and	low	worriers.	Again,	replication	of	the	examination	of	both	 IU	 and	 goal	 directed	 worry	 rules	 and	 their	 relationship	 with	worry	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 important	 future	 endeavour.	 	 Finally,	although	 there	 was	 no	 evidence	 of	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	positive	 and	 negative	 belief	 about	 worry	 and	 worry	 outcomes,	 a	number	 of	 theories	 of	 worry	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 positive	beliefs	about	worry	 in	the	maintenance	of	worry	(e.g.	 the	 intolerance	of	uncertainty	model	of	worry	(Koerner	&	Dugas,	2006)	and	the	mood-
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as-input	account	of	worry	(Davey,	2006;	Meeten	&	Davey,	2011).	One	possibility	is	that	positive	beliefs	about	worry	do	not	causally	relate	to	worry	 per	 se,	 but	 do	 influence	 worry	 perseveration	 through	 their	relationship	 with	 other	 cognitive	 constructs	 (e.g.	 Davey	 &	 Meeten,	2016).		5.3	Areas	for	future	research	development		As	 a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 papers	 were	 included	 in	 the	final	review,	this	highlights	the	fact	that	even	though	many	of	the	links	between	 cognitive	 constructs	 and	 pathological	 worry	 are	 assumed,	there	 is	 relatively	 little	 research	 demonstrating	 these	 causal	 links.	Experimental	psychopathology	techniques	are	a	valuable	tool	through	which	 to	 model	 potentially	 causal	 relationships	 between	 cognitive	constructs	and	measures	of	worry.	Of	course,	in	order	for	the	model	to	be	useful,	both	the	construct	being	measured	and	the	worry	outcome	measure	must	have	construct	validity	(Vervliet	&	Raes,	2013).	For	this	reason,	 experiments	 that	 had	 a	 single-item	 worry	 measure	 as	 a	dependent	 variable	 were	 excluded	 from	 the	 review,	 as	 they	 are	unlikely	to	have	acceptable	validity	or	reliability.	Both	the	behavioural	measures	 of	 worry	 examined	 in	 this	 review	 (worry	 breathing	 focus	task	 and	 the	 worry	 catastrophising	 interview)	 have	 been	 shown	 to	differentiate	 performance	 of	 non-clinical	 worriers	 from	 clinical	worriers,	 suggesting	 good	 construct	 validity.	 In	 future	 research,	behavioural	 assessments	 of	 worry	 in	 the	 lab	 may	 be	 augmented	 by	psychophysiology	measures	 such	 as	 heart	 rate	 variability	which	 is	 a	physiological	correlate	of	worry	(Chalmers,	Heathers,	Abbott,	Kemp,	&	Quintana,	2016;	Ottaviani,	Shahabi,	et	al.,	2015).	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 while	 experimental	 designs	 can	account	for	confounding	variables	such	as	levels	of	trait	worry,	age,	sex	etc.,	 these	 experiments	 cannot	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	manipulating	 one	 cognitive	 construct,	 will	 also	 influence	 another,	which	remains	unmeasured.	Understanding	more	about	how	cognitive	constructs	 relate	 to	 each	 other	 as	well	 as	 to	measures	 of	worry	will	
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provide	further	knowledge	about	the	development	and	maintenance	of	pathological	 worry.	 	 Future	 experiments	 may	 usefully	 include	mediation	models	to	help	elucidating	further	information	about	nature	of	the	relationships	between	these	cognitive	constructs	and	worry.		Effect	 sizes	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 experiments	 were	 large,	suggesting	 that	 these	were	 robust	effects.	However,	 effect	 sizes	were	not	universally	 reported	 (where	missing	 they	were	 calculated	by	 the	author	 of	 this	 paper)	 and	 it	 will	 improve	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	relationships	between	manipulated	constructs	and	outcome	measures	if	 this	 information	 is	 routinely	 included	 in	 research	 articles.	 As	with	many	 published	 psychology	 studies,	 the	 majority	 of	 experiments	 in	this	 review	 recruited	 university	 students	 for	 their	 study	 sample.	Ecological	 validity	 of	 findings	 may	 be	 improved	 by	 future	 studies	recruiting	 a	 community	 sample.	 Although	 not	 always	 requested	 by	academic	journals,	this	research	area	would	benefit	from	a	discussion	of	 power	 and	 subsequently	 sample	 sizes	 in	 experimental	psychopathology	research.	Often	researchers	may	be	developing	novel	techniques	 to	 examine	 a	 construct	 and	 this	 can	 make	 sample	 size	calculation	 feel	 imprecise	 with	 little	 previous	 literature	 to	 provide	estimation	of	effect	size.	However,	discussion	of	these	issues	would	be	informative	in	providing	a	guide	as	to	how	sample	size	considerations	had	been	resolved.		5.4	Limitations	The	 present	 review	 has	 some	 limitations.	 The	 review	 was	conducted	by	one	researcher	with	a	second	researcher	quality	control	scoring	only	a	subset	of	articles.	 	Although	there	was	high	agreement	between	the	two	reviewers,	best	practice	would	be	 to	double	rate	all	articles	in	order	to	avoid	bias	by	one	individual.	A	second	limitation	is	that	 ‘grey’	 literature	 was	 not	 sought	 from	 researchers	 in	 this	 field.	Publication	bias	 in	 favour	 of	 significant	 findings	may	be	 skewing	 the	knowledge	base	 in	this	area,	 thus	examination	of	grey	 literature	such	as	unpublished	findings	would	enable	us	to	consider	this	possibility.		
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7.1	Appendix	1	 Quality	assessment	tool	Authors:	 		1.	Is	the	hypothesis/aim/objective	of	the	study	clearly	described?	Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -		2.	Was	there	an	appropriate	comparator/control	group?	Yes	 the	 control	 group	was	appropriate		 2	Yes	 there	 was	 a	 control	group	 but	 it	 could	 have	been	 more	 appropriate	for	the	study	
1	
No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -		3.	Outcome:	can	you	identify	the	primary	outcome?	Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -		4.	Can	you	identify	the	construct	to	be	manipulated?	Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	
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N/A	 1		5.	Was	the	sample	randomised	if	appropriate	to	do	so?	How	did	randomization	occur	(do	not	score	on	this)?	Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 1	N/A	 =	may	 not	 be	 appropriate	 to	 randomise	 e.g.	 comparing	 high	 vs.	low	worriers	so	in	this	case	score	1	6.	Was	experimental	manipulation	well-described	and	appropriate?	Yes	–	well	described	AND	appropriate		 2	Yes	 –	well	 described	 but	questionable	appropriateness	 for	study		
1	
No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -		7.	 Were	 participant	 characteristics	 reported	 e.g.	 age,	 sex,	 cohort	(community	sample/student	sample)	level	of	education?		Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -	N.B.	At	least	two	of	the	above	need	to	be	reported	to	score			8a.	Were	groups	similar	at	baseline	on	relevant	measures?	e.g.	similar	in	age,	sex,	baseline	measures	of	worry,	mood?	Yes	 1	
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No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 1	N.	B.	Here	groups	may	be	different	at	baseline	by	design	e.g.	high	low	worry	groups.	If	so,	score	N/A	=	1		8b.	 Were	 any	 statistically	 significant	 differences	 adjusted	 for	 e.g.	 by	matching	in	design	of	study	or	controlled	for	in	the	analysis?	Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 1		9.	 Are	 the	 main	 findings	 clearly	 described?	 E.g.	 mean	 scores	 with	measures	of	variance	(SD,	SE,	or	CI)	Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -			10.	 Are	 you	 confident	 with	 author/s	 choice	 and	 use	 of	 statistical	methods?	E.g.	to	the	best	of	your	knowledge	are	the	statistical	methods	appropriate	for	the	aims	of	the	study?		Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -				
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		11.	Dependent	variable:	Was	the	outcome	measure	appropriate?	Yes:	 worry	 measure	previously	 piloted	valid/reliable	 and	represents	 state	 changes	in	worry	
2	
Yes:	 but	 unsure	 about	validity/reliability	 and	appropriateness	 as	worry	outcome	measure	
1	
No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -	
 
 12.	Conclusions:	Were	conclusions	supported	by	results?	Yes	 1	No	 0	Don’t	know	 0	N/A	 -		13.	Did	the	authors	identify	any	limitations?	Yes	 1	No	 0		Score	---/17	Notes	for	discussion	or	to	clarify	responses.					
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7.2	Appendix	2	 Worry	breathing	focus	task	Hirsch	 and	 colleagues	 	 (Hayes	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Hayes,	 Hirsch,	 &	Mathews,	2010;	Hirsch	et	al.,	2011,	2009;	Hirsch	et	al.,	2015;	Krebs	et	al.,	2010;	Stokes	&	Hirsch,	2010)	employed	the	worry	breathing	focus	task	 as	 a	 behavioural	measure	 of	worry.	 This	 task	 is	 adapted	 from	a	behavioural	 measure	 of	 worry	 developed	 by	 Borkovec,	 Robinson,	Pruzinsky,	 and	 DePree	 (1983)	 and	 refined	 by	 Ruscio	 and	 Borkovec	(2004).	Typically,	the	task	involves	3	phases.	Two	5	minute	breathing	phases	take	place	before	and	after	a	5	minute	worry	period.			The	task	is	described	below	by	Hirsch	et	al.	(2009,	p.47-48)	“During	 each	 5-min	 breathing	 focus	 period,	 participants	were	instructed	to	focus	their	attention	on	their	breathing,	and	a	computer-generated	tone	sounded	at	random	intervals	of	between	20	and	30	s,	generating	a	 total	of	12	 tones	during	each	breathing	 focus	period.	At	each	of	these	tones,	participants	indicated	whether	their	attention	was	focused	on	their	breathing	or	if	at	that	moment	they	had	experienced	a	thought	intrusion.	If	they	had	an	intrusion,	they	then	rated	whether	it	was	 positive,	 neutral,	 or	 negative	 in	 content	 and	 gave	 a	 brief	description	 (e.g.,	 “positive—going	 out	 tonight”).	 At	 the	 end	 of	 each	breathing	focus	period,	participants	completed	mood	rating	scales	(see	above)	 and	 answered	 three	 questions	 related	 to	 the	 breathing	 focus	period:	 “Estimate	 the	percentage	 to	which	you	were	able	 to	 focus	on	your	 breathing	 (0%	 not	 at	 all–100%	 all	 of	 the	 time)”;	 “Rate	 how	difficult	 you	 found	 focusing	 on	 your	 breathing	 (0	 not	 at	 all	 difficult–100	 extremely	 difficult)”;	 and	 “Estimate	 the	 percentage	 of	 time	 you	worried	during	 the	 last	5	minutes	 (0%	none	of	 the	 time–100%	all	of	the	time).”		“After	the	first	breathing	focus	period,	participants	identified	a	current	worry	 topic	which	 they	 then	discussed	briefly	with	 the	experimenter	to	ensure	that	it	was	related	to	a	potentially	negative	future	situation.	
	 70	










	 	 	 Worry	catastrophising	interview		


































1.	ABSTRACT	This	 study	 investigated	 whether	 facilitating	 a	 benign	 interpretation	bias	 in	 participants	 with	 high	 trait	 worry,	 affected	 interpretation	 of	ambiguous	 information	 at	 two	 different	 stages	 of	 information	processing.	 The	 bias	 assessment	 tasks	 (completed	 before	 and	 after	participants	received	either	a	benign	interpretation	bias	training	or	a	control	 condition	 sham	 training)	 examined	 fast,	 reflexive	interpretations	 of	 ambiguity	 (online	 task)	 and	 slower	 reflective	interpretations	 (offline	 task).	The	effect	of	benign	 interpretation	bias	training	 on	 negative	 thought	 intrusions	 after	 a	worry	 period	 and	 on	heart	 rate	 variability	 (HRV)	 was	 also	 assessed.	 Participants	 were	randomly	allocated	to	benign	interpretation	bias	training	or	a	control	condition	sham	training.	There	was	an	effect	of	 training	condition	on	training	 test	 trials	 in	 the	 expected	 direction	 where	 the	 benign	condition	interpreted	ambiguous	scenarios	in	a	more	positive	manner	than	the	control	condition.	There	was	no	effect	of	training	condition	on	online	 or	 offline	 bias	 assessment	 tasks,	 or	 on	 number	 of	 negative	thought	 intrusions	 in	 the	 worry	 breathing	 focus	 task.	 There	 was	 a	significant	 increase	 in	 HRV	 from	 pre	 to	 post	 interpretation	 bias	training	in	the	benign	training	condition,	but	not	the	control	condition.		Potential	explanations	as	to	why	there	was	no	effect	of	interpretation	bias	 training	 on	 the	 online	 and	 offline	 bias	 assessment	 tasks	 are	discussed,	as	are	directions	for	future	research.							 	
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2.	INTRODUCTION	Everybody	 worries	 from	 time	 to	 time	 and	 worry	 is	 typically	defined	as	 transient	 and	 limited	 in	 scope	 (Ruscio,	 2002).	 In	 contrast,	pathological	 worry	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 negatively	 valenced,	uncontrollable	 (Borkovec	 et	 al.,	 1983)	 and	 predominately	 verbal	(Borkovec,	Ray,	&	Stober,	1998).	Excessive	and	uncontrollable	worry	is	the	 defining	 feature	 of	 generalised	 anxiety	 disorder	 (GAD;	 American	Psychiatric	Association,	2013).	Individuals	who	experience	high	levels	of	 worry	 (either	 with	 or	 without	 a	 GAD	 diagnosis)	 experience	 poor	perceived	 physical	 health	 and	 increased	 levels	 of	 sleep	 difficulties	(Kertz	 &	 Woodruff-Borden,	 2011).	 Excessive	 worry	 thus	 has	 a	significant	 impact	 on	 psychological	 and	 occupational	 functioning.	Developing	a	better	understanding	of	the	mechanisms	that	contribute	to	the	development	and	maintenance	of	worry	is	vital.			 Cognitive	models	of	worry	(e.g.	Davey	&	Meeten,	2016;	Hirsch	&	Mathews,	 2012)	 highlight	 the	 role	 of	 information	 processing	 biases	(both	 interpretation	 biases	 and	 attention	 biases)	 in	 the	 onset	 and	maintenance	 of	 worry	 in	 GAD.	 For	 example,	 biases	 in	 attention	contribute	 to	 excessive	 and	 pathological	 worry	 by	 enhancing	 the	ability	to	detect	and	selectively	attend	to	threat	cues	(Mathews,	1990).	Individuals	who	experience	excessive	and	uncontrollable	anxiety	have	been	shown	to	attend	to	threat-relevant	information	at	the	expense	of	benign	 or	 positive	 information	 (Mathews	&	MacLeod,	 1994;	 Andrew	Mathews	 &	MacLeod,	 2002).	 The	 role	 of	 attentional	 biases	 in	 worry	and	GAD	have	been	recently	discussed	by	Goodwin,	Yiend,	and	Hirsch	(2017).			 The	 focus	 of	 the	 present	 study	 will	 be	 on	 the	 role	 of	interpretation	biases	in	pathological	worry.	Ambiguity	is	a	normal	part	of	 daily	 life.	 However,	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 people	 with	 GAD	interpret	 ambiguous	 scenarios	 in	 a	more	 threatening	manner	 than	 a	non-anxious	 control	 group	 (Butler	 &	 Mathews,	 1983).	 Using	 a	recognition	task,	Eysenck,	Mogg,	May,	Richards	and	Mathews	 	(1991)	asked	 individuals	with	 GAD,	 recovered	 clinically	 anxious	 individuals,	
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and	 a	 non-clinical	 control	 group	 to	 listen	 to	 sentences	 that	 were	ambiguous	 (e.g.	 “your	 boss	 calls	 you	 into	 their	 office	 to	 talk	 to	 you	about	the	quality	of	your	recent	work”)	and	could	thus	be	interpreted	in	 either	 a	 threatening	 or	 a	 benign	 manner.	 Participants	 were	 then	shown	sentences	that	were	similar	in	theme	to	the	original	sentences	but	 were	 unambiguously	 non-threatening	 (‘Your	 boss	 calls	 you	 into	their	 office	 to	 congratulate	 you	 on	 your	 work’)	 or	 unambiguously	threatening	 (‘Your	 boss	 calls	 you	 into	 their	 office	 to	 say	 they	 are	disappointed	with	your	work’)	and	were	asked	to	rate	how	similar	the	sentence	was	to	the	original	ambiguous	scenario.	Individuals	with	GAD	endorsed	 more	 ambiguous	 scenarios	 as	 being	 threatening	 than	 the	recovered	 anxious	 participants	 and	 the	 non-anxious	 control	 group.	Mathews	 and	 Mackintosh	 (2000)	 also	 used	 a	 recognition	 task	 with	social	 scenarios	 after	 positive	 and	 negative	 interpretation	 bias	 had	been	 induced.	 They	 found	 that	 positively	 induced	 participants	 were	more	 likely	 to	 endorse	 positive	 targets,	 but	 negatively	 induced	participants	 were	 equally	 likely	 to	 endorse	 positive	 and	 negative	targets.	There	 is	 now	 robust	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 interpretation	biases	can	be	modified	 (cognitive	bias	modification	of	 interpretation;	CBM-I)	such	that	individuals	with	high	trait	worry	and	those	with	GAD	can	be	trained	to	interpret	ambiguity	in	a	benign	manner	(e.g.	Hayes,	Hirsch,	 Krebs,	 &	 Mathews,	 2010;	 Hirsch,	 Hayes,	 &	 Mathews,	 2009).	These	methods	have	been	used	to	examine	the	effect	of	interpretation	bias	manipulation	on	near	transfer	tasks	(near	transfer	tasks	examine	whether	cognitive	bias	manipulation	training	transfers	onto	a	measure	of	 the	 bias	 itself,	 such	 as	 the	 recognition	 task;	 cf.	 Mathews	 &	Mackintosh,	2000;	Salemink	&	van	den	Hout,	2010)	and	on	far	transfer	tasks	(far	transfer	tasks	examine	whether	cognitive	bias	manipulation	training	transfers	onto	a	task	that	examines	a	core	component	of	GAD	symptomology,	 such	 intrusive	worry	 thoughts	 (cf.	 Hayes	 et	 al.	 2010;	Hirsch	et	al.	2009).	However,	when	examining	how	CBM-I	affected	an	
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assessment	 of	 the	 bias	 itself	 (near	 transfer	 tasks),	 none	 of	 these	previous	studies	took	baseline	measures	of	the	bias	into	account.	CBM-I	techniques	have	provided	evidence	of	the	causal	role	of	this	 bias	 in	 worry.	 However,	 little	 is	 known	 about	 the	 mechanisms	through	 which	 these	 biases	 operate.	 For	 example,	 in	 pathological	worry	 it	 is	 not	 known	 whether	 the	 interpretation	 bias	 occurs	 as	 a	quick,	 automatic	 judgement	 when	 ambiguity	 is	 first	 encountered	(known	 as	 an	 online	 judgement),	 or	 as	 a	 more	 thoughtful	 reflective	process	 after	 there	 is	opportunity	 for	 reflection	 (known	as	 an	offline	judgement).	 	 In	 their	 review	 of	 interpretation	 biases	 in	 emotional	disorders,	 Hirsch,	 Meeten,	 Krahé	 and	 Reeder	 (2016)	 highlight	differences	between	offline	and	online	biases.	Offline	paradigms	such	as	 self-report	 questionnaires	 and	 memory	 based	 recognition	 tasks		allow	participants	to	select	from	a	range	of	interpretations	rather	than	the	 first	 one	 that	 comes	 to	 mind.	 There	 is	 correlational	 and	experimental	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 interpretation	 biases	operate	at	 the	offline	processing	stage	 in	pathological	worry	 through	use	 of	 a	 reflective	 processing	 tasks	 such	 as	 the	 recognition	 task	(Eysenck	 et	 al.,	 1991;	Mathews	&	Mackintosh,	 2000;	 Salemink	&	van	den	Hout,	2010)	or	a	sentence	completion	task	(Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	et	 al.,	 2010).	 Online	 paradigms	 examine	 interpretations	 made	 when	the	 ambiguity	 is	 first	 encountered	 and	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 relatively	automatic.	 In	 the	 social	 anxiety	 disorder	 literature	 online	 tasks	 have	included	a	speeded	lexical	decision	task	(Hirsch	&	Mathews,	2000)	and	examining	 event	 related	 potentials	 (Moser,	 Huppert,	 Foa,	 &	 Simons,	2012).	 Making	 the	 distinction	 between	 these	 different	 stages	 of	interpretation	 is	 important	 if	 we	 are	 to	 better	 understand	 the	mechanism	 through	 which	 interpretation	 biases	 contribute	 to	pathological	worry.	In	social	anxiety	disorder,	research	has	shown	that	individuals	 with	 high	 trait	 social	 anxiety	 interpret	 ambiguous	situations	more	negatively	 than	a	control	group	 in	an	offline	context,	but	less	positively	in	an	online	context	(Foa,	Kozak,	Salkovskis,	Coles,	&	Amir,	1998;		Hirsch	&	Mathews,	2000;	Stopa	&	Clark,	2000).		A	better	
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understanding	of	the	manner	in	which	interpretation	biases	operate	in	pathological	worry	may	 lead	 to	 interventions	 that	 target	 the	point	at	which	the	threat	interpretation	occurs.		One	 way	 of	 assessing	 a	 relatively	 automatic	 online	interpretation	 bias	 is	 to	 ask	 participants	 to	 identify	 a	 positive	 or	negative	word	fragment	using	a	speeded	task	where	the	interpretation	judgement	 is	 made	 in	 under	 2000ms	 (cf.	 Hirsch	 &	 Mathews,	 2000).		Salemink	 &	 van	 den	 Hout	 (2010)	 trained	 non-high	 trait	 anxious	participants	to	make	positive	or	negative	interpretations	of	ambiguous	information.	They	assessed	near	transfer	in	two	ways.	One	assessment	employed	 the	 recognition	 task	 (as	 described	 above).	 A	 second	assessment	 looked	 at	 reaction	 time	 to	 solve	 word	 fragments	 that	disambiguated	 an	 ambiguous	 scenario	 e.g.	 faster	 reaction	 time	 to	positive	 words	 would	 indicate	 a	 positive	 bias	 and	 vice	 versa	 with	negative	 words.	 In	 the	 Salemink	 &	 van	 den	 Hout	 (2010)	 study,	participants	were	not	asked	to	make	very	quick	judgements	about	the	word	(e.g.	under	2000ms)	so	it	 is	unclear	whether	this	data	captured	reflective	 offline	 processing	 or	 quick	 automatic	 online	 judgements.	However,	 the	 mean	 reaction	 times	 ranged	 from	 1303ms	 –	 1453ms,	indicating	 that	 participants	 were	 able	 to	 make	 speeded	 decisions	 to	identify	a	word	fragment.	Salemink	and	van	den	Hout	(2010)	reported	that	 CBM-I	 was	 successful	 at	 modifying	 interpretation	 bias	 whereby	the	positive	bias	training	group	solved	positive	word	fragments	faster	than	negative	and	there	was	a	trend	for	the	opposite	pattern	of	results	in	 the	 negative	 bias	 training	 group.	 In	 the	 recognition	 task,	participants	 in	 the	 positive	 group	 interpreted	 the	 ambiguous	information	 as	 being	 significantly	 more	 positive	 than	 negative	 and	again	the	opposite	was	the	case	for	the	negatively	trained	group.		Hirsch	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 suggest	 that	 online	 assessment	 of	interpretation	 biases	 should	 also	 include	 biological	 paradigms.	Although	 unable	 to	 examine	 interpretation	 per	 se,	 examining	 heart	rate	 variability	 (HRV)	 before	 and	 after	 bias	 training	 may	 provide	 a	more	 general	 physiological	 assessment	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 CBM-I	
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training	 can	 influence	 processes	 that	 operate	 outside	 of	 conscious	awareness.	Pathological	worry	is	consistently	related	to	low	heart	rate	variability	(HRV),	which	is	a	risk	factor	for	poor	cardiovascular	health	(Brosschot,	Gerin,	&	Thayer,	2006;	Brosschot,	Pieper,	&	Thayer,	2005;	Ottaviani	 &	 Shapiro,	 2011;	 Thayer,	 Friedman,	 &	 Borkovec,	 1996;	Verkuil,	Brosschot,	Gebhardt,	&	Thayer,	2010).	Low	HRV	is	associated	with	a	rigid	and	inflexible	autonomic	response	to	threat	and	cognitive	rigidity	as	seen	 in	pathological	worry	 is	 thought	to	mirror	autonomic	inflexibility	 (Ottaviani,	 Medea,	 Lonigro,	 Tarvainen,	 &	 Couyoumdjian,	2015;	 Ottaviani,	 Shapiro,	&	 Couyoumdjian,	 2013).	 	 As	 highlighted	 by	Park	 and	 Thayer	 (2014),	 low	 resting	 HRV	 is	 associated	 with	maladaptive	 cognitive	 responses	 to	 emotional	 stimuli.	 Specifically,	high	levels	of	worry	have	been	associated	with	reduced	HRV	and	HRV	has	 been	 hypothesised	 to	 be	 a	 biomarker	 of	 worry	 (Chalmers	 et	 al.,	2016).	Where	CBM-I	training	has	previously	reduced	worry	symptoms	(Hirsch	et	al.	2009),	one	possibility	is	that	a	physiological	correlate	of	reduced	 worry	 is	 an	 increase	 in	 HRV.	 By	 examining	 heart	 rate	variability	 (HRV)	 pre	 and	 post	 CBM-I	 training,	 one	 can	 examine	whether	 training	participants	 to	have	a	benign	 interpretation	style	 is	associated	with	a	change	in	HRV.	As	outlined	above,	literature	examining	interpretation	biases	in	clinical	 and	 subclinical	 populations	 document	 the	 presence	 of	interpretation	 biases	 in	 worry.	 However,	 the	 mechanism	 through	which	these	biases	function,	remains	poorly	understood	(Clarke,	Chen,	&	 Guastella,	 2012).	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 experiment	 is	 thus	 to	 examine	interpretation	 biases	 in	 a	 high	 trait	worry	 sample	 at	 both	 the	 online	and	offline	stages	of	processing	after	CBM-I	training	as	compared	to	a	sham	control	training.	By	completing	bias	assessment	before	and	after	training,	we	can	examine	how	interpretation	bias	changes	as	a	result	of	CBM-I	 training.	 In	 addition,	 we	 will	 also	 examine	 whether	 CBM-I	training	has	 a	physiological	 correlate	by	 assessing	HRV	pre	 and	post	training.	Finally,	to	examine	the	clinical	 implications	of	 interpretation	bias	modification	 and	 to	 replicate	 previous	 findings	 in	 this	 area	 ,the	
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experiment	 will	 assess	 far	 transfer	 of	 the	 CBM-I	 training	 by	 using	 a	worry	breathing	focus	task	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2009).	
Hypotheses	1.	 It	 is	 predicted	 that	 participants	 in	 the	 CBM-I	 training	 condition	will	show	 a	 reduction	 in	 negative	 interpretations	 at	 the	 offline	 and	 online	stages	 of	 interpretation	 after	 CBM-I	 training,	 but	 that	 no	 post-training	shift	in	interpretation	will	be	evident	in	the	sham	control	condition.		2.	It	is	predicted	that	CBM-I	training	to	interpret	ambiguous	information	in	 a	 benign	 manner	 will	 result	 in	 an	 increase	 in	 HRV	 whereas	 sham-control	training	will	not.		3.	 It	 is	 predicted	 that	 there	will	 be	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 negative	thought	intrusions	as	measured	by	the	worry	breathing	focus	task	post	CBM-I	training.	The	benign	condition,	who	receive	benign	CBM-I	training	will	 report	 significantly	 fewer	 negative	 intrusions	 as	 compared	 to	 the	control	group.	
3.	METHOD	3.1	Design	The	experiment	involved	four	phases.	Phase	one	was	a	baseline	assessment	 phase	 that	 includes	 demographics,	 state	 and	 trait	 mood	measures,	online	and	offline	interpretation	bias	assessments	and	a	5-minute	HRV	resting	state	assessment.	Phase	two	was	an	interpretation	bias	 training	 task,	 where	 participants	 received	 either	 benign	 CBM-I	training	 or	 sham	 (50/50	 benign	 and	 negative	 stimuli)	 training	depending	 on	 their	 group	 allocation.	 Phase	 three	was	post	 induction	assessment	 of	 HRV	 and	 online	 and	 offline	 interpretation	 bias	measures.	Phase	four	was	the	worry	breathing	focus	task.		3.2	Participants	Participants	 were	 recruited	 via	 adverts	 in	 the	 King’s	 College	research	 participation	 forum	 and	 via	 a	 Gumtree	 advert	 seeking	 high	worriers.	 Volunteers	 completed	 the	 Penn	 State	Worry	 Questionnaire	(PSWQ;	Meyer,	Miller,	Metzger,	&	Borkovec,	1990)	and	 responded	 to	screening	 questions	 concerning	 age	 (participants	 had	 to	 be	 over	 18	
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years	of	age),	current	medication	usage	and	whether	they	had	English	as	a	first	language.	Participants	were	invited	to	take	part	in	the	study	if	they	were	not	taking	medication	(for	the	purpose	of	HRV	assessment),	had	 English	 as	 a	 first	 language	 (due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 bias	assessment	tasks)	and	had	a	score	of		≥	56	on	the	PSWQ	(Meyer	et	al.,	1990).	This	cut-off	score	was	chosen	as	a	score	of	56	falls	one	standard	deviation	below	the	mean	for	individuals	diagnosed	with	GAD	(Molina	&	Borkovec,	1994).	Fifty	one	participants	completed	the	PSWQ	(Meyer	et	al.,	1990)	again	on	the	day	of	 the	study	to	check	that	 they	met	 the	cut-off	 criteria	 and	 two	 participants	 were	 subsequently	 excluded.	Participants	 were	 randomised	 into	 either	 the	 benign	 CBM-I	 benign	training	group	(n	=	25)	or	the	control	(sham-training)	group	(n	=	24),	36	 participants	 were	 female	 and	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 difference	between	 numbers	 of	 males	 and	 females	 in	 each	 condition	 (p	=	 .69).	There	was	 no	 significant	 difference	 in	 age	 between	 the	 benign	 (M	 =	24.32,	SD	=	6.99)	and	the	control	(M	=	25.88,	SD	=	5.30)	group,	t(47)	=	.85,	 p	 =	 .40.	 The	 average	 level	 of	 education	 reached	 was	 Bachelor	Degree	 in	 both	 groups,	 with	 no	 significant	 difference	 in	 educational	level	between	groups,	t(47)	=	.67,	p	=	.51).	3.3	Ethical	considerations	Ethical	 approval	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 study	was	 granted	by	King’s	College	 Research	 Ethics	 Committee	 (see	 Appendix	 3	 for	 ethics	approval	 letter).	At	 the	end	of	 the	study	all	participants	were	offered	an	 information	 sheet	 which	 included	 NHS	 guidelines	 about	management	of	worry	should	they	feel	concerned	about	the	amount	of	worry	they	were	experiencing	and	signposting	to	self	help	resources.			3.4	Materials	
3.4.1	Emotional	assessment	instruments		Penn	State	Worry	Questionnaire:	The	PSWQ	(Meyer	et	al.	1990)	is	a	measure	of	trait	worry.	The	PSWQ	consists	of	16-items	(e.g.	‘Once	I	start	worrying	I	cannot	stop’),	which	are	rated	on	a	5-point	Likert	scale	
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ranging	from	(1)	‘not	at	all	typical	of	me’	to	(5)	‘very	typical	of	me’.	The	PSWQ	has	good	test-retest	reliability	(r	=	 .74-.93;	Molina	&	Borkovec,	1994),	internal	consistency	(α	=		.90;	Brown,	Antony,	&	Barlow,	1992),	and	discriminant	validity	(Meyer	et	al.,	1990).	State-Trait	 Anxiety	 Inventory	 (STAI):	 The	 STAI-trait	(Spielberger,	Gorsuch,	Lushene,	Vagg,	&	Jacobs,	1983)	assessment	was	used	 as	 a	measure	 of	 trait	 anxiety.	 There	 are	 10	 questions	 to	 assess	trait	 anxiety.	 On	 a	 four	 point	 scale	 from	 ‘almost	 never’	 to	 ‘almost	always’	participants	are	asked	to	 think	about	how	they	generally	 feel	and	 respond	 to	 questions	 such	 as	 ‘I	 feel	 like	 a	 failure’.	 The	 STAI-trait/state	scale	has	good	internal	consistency	with	coefficients	in	the	range	of	α	=	0.86	to	0.95	and	good	test-retest	reliability	r	=	0.65	to	0.75	over	a	2-month	interval	(Spielberger	et	al.,	1983).	
3.4.2	Visual	analogue	scales		Three	100mm	visual	analogue	scales	(VAS)	measuring	current	mood	state	of	sadness,	anxiety,	and	happiness	were	completed	at	 the	baseline	 phase	 and	 post	 CBM-I	 training.	 Visual	 analogue	 scales	 have	good	 reliability,	 validity	 and	 internal	 consistency	 as	 measures	 for	mood	 and	 depression	 (Hicks,	 &	 Nino-Murcia,	 1991;	 Lingjaerde	 &	Foreland,	1998).		3.5	Heart	rate	variability	assessment	Heart	 rate	 (HR)	was	 recorded	 as	 beat-to-beat	 intervals	 in	ms	with	the	Bodyguard	2	(Firstbeat)	HR	monitor.	Heart	rate	is	measured	by	placing	a	light-weight	device	attached	to	a	disposable	electrode	just	below	the	right	collar	bone,	with	a	second	electrode	placed	on	the	left	rib-cage.	 The	 experimenter	 demonstrated	 the	 placement	 of	 the	electrodes	 and	 the	 participant	 then	 placed	 the	 devoice	 themselves.	Participants	wore	the	device	for	the	duration	of	the	study.	At	the	end	of	 the	 study	 the	 participant	 removed	 the	 disposable	 electrodes	 and	device	 and	 were	 offered	 a	 fragrance	 free	 wipe	 to	 remove	 any	remaining	electrode	gel.		
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	 HRV	was	 assessed	 pre	 and	 post	 training	 in	 5	minute	 resting-state	 blocks.	 During	 this	 time	 the	 participant	 was	 asked	 to	 remain	seated	and	as	still	as	possible	while	also	remaining	comfortable	and	to	allow	 their	mind	wander	 to	 any	 topic	 that	 they	 usually	 think	 about.	Kubios	 HRV	 software	 (Tarvainen,	 Niskanen,	 Lipponen,	 Ranta-aho,	 &	Karjalainen,	2014)	was	used	 to	manually	check	 the	data	 for	artefacts	and	perform	the	HRV	analysis.	Artefacts	were	defined	as	beat-to-beat	intervals	corresponding	to	a	HR	<	30	bpm	or	>	200	bpm	as	well	as	any	intervals	 resulting	 in	 an	 increase	 or	 drop	 in	 heart	 rate	 by	 >	 30%	between	 successive	 intervals1.	 Where	 an	 artefact	 occurred	 near	 the	beginning	or	end	of	a	time	period,	that	section	was	excluded	from	the	analysis	providing	the	time	period	did	not	fall	below	4	minutes	(Munoz	et	 al.,	 2015).	Were	 the	artefact	was	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	 time	period,	correction	 to	 the	data	was	applied	until	 the	data	was	 in	 the	required	ranges	 (Task-force,	 1996).	 Correction	 to	 the	 data	 was	 necessary	 on	three	 occasions.	 HRV	 was	 estimated	 using	 the	 root	 mean	 square	successive	 difference	 (RMSSD)	 measure,	 a	 reliable	 parameter	 for	assessing	vagally-mediated	HRV	(Task	Force,	1996).	
3.6	Interpretation	bias	assessment	tasks		
3.6.1	Online	task:	Completed	at	pre	and	post	CBM-I	training		The	online	task	is	adapted	from	Mathews	and	Mackintosh	(2000)	and	 Salemink	 &	 van	 den	 Hout	 (2010)	 to	 assess	 online	 (<	 2000ms)	interpretation	of		ambiguous	scenarios.	A	pilot	project	was	completed	in	order	 to	 aid	 choice	 of	 scenarios	 for	 the	 task	 (see	 Appendix	 1	 for	overview	of	pilot	data).	Sixty	scenarios	based	on	topics	identified	in	the	Worry	Domains	Questionnaire	(Tallis,	Davey,	&	Bond,	1994)	were	used	in	 the	 main	 task.	 The	 online,	 offline	 and	 CBM-I	 training	 tasks	 were	created	 using	 E-Prime	 2.0	 software	 (Psychology	 Software	 Tools,	Pittsburgh,	PA).	During	the	online	task,	participants	saw	a	scenario	on	a																																																									1	Decision	on	the	range	of	acceptable	HRV	interval	values	for	artefact	calculation	was	based	on	personal	communication	with	Dr	Cristina	Ottaviani.			
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computer	screen	presented	one	 line	at	a	 time.	Participants	pressed	the	space	bar	when	they	were	ready	to	move	to	the	next	line	so	reading	was	self-paced.	The	 scenario	 remained	ambiguous	 in	valence	until	 the	 final	word,	which	appeared	as	a	word	fragment.	The	participant	was	asked	to	press	 the	 space	 bar	when	 they	 knew	what	 the	word	was.	 As	 this	 task	purposefully	 sought	 quick	 judgments,	 participants	 had	 2000ms	 to	respond.	If	they	did	not	respond	in	this	time,	they	heard	a	short	tone	to	signal	an	error.	When	a	response	was	given	(or	after	2000ms)	a	message	appeared	asking	participants	to	type	in	the	missing	letter.	Two	lists	(List	A	 and	 B)	 were	 prepared	 containing	 30	 scenarios	 and	 within	 each	 list	participants	 saw	 15	 scenarios	 with	 a	 positive	 outcome	 and	 15	 with	 a	negative	 outcome	 and	 the	 dependent	 variable	was	 time	 to	 respond	 to	words	 which	 disambiguated	 the	 scenario	 in	 a	 positive	 manner	 and	 a	negative	manner.	List	A	or	B	were	presented	in	counter	balanced	order	at	baseline	and	after	the	CBM-I	assessment.	An	example	scenario	is	“You	are	in	a	hurry	and	have	forgotten	to	buy	your	brother	a	birthday	present.	On	your	way	to	meet	him	you	stop	at	a	shop	to	pick	something	up.	You	watch	 him	 open	 it	 and	 can	 tell	 by	 the	 look	 on	 his	 face	 that	 he	 is	pl_ased/di_appointed”.	The	dependent	variable	is	the	reaction	time	(RT)	response	 to	resolving	 the	disambiguating	word.	 It	 is	assumed	that	bias	can	 be	 inferred	 by	 RT	 where	 a	 slower	 RT	 is	 incongruent	 to	 the	participant’s	 immediate	 online	 comprehension	 of	 the	 scenario	 (e.g.	participants	with	a	negative	online	interpretation	bias	would	be	faster	to	recognise	 negative	 as	 opposed	 to	 positive	 words).	 Prior	 to	 analysis,	participant	 data	 was	 excluded	 if	 they	 responded	 that	 they	 knew	 the	word,	but	then	provided	an	incorrect	letter	for	the	word	fragment,	or	if	they	reported	they	know	the	word	in	50ms	or	less	as	this	was	unlikely	to	be	a	meaningful	response	(Ledgeway	&	Hutchinson,	2008).	Finally,	 if	6	or	more	 (out	of	15)	negative	or	positive	 responses	were	 incorrect,	 the	participant’s	 data	 for	 that	 block	 of	 the	 task	was	 entered	 as	missing	 as	only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 responses	 would	 be	 representing	 the	 median	reaction	time.	If	a	participant	had	more	than	50%	of	their	data	missing,	they	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 analysis.	 This	 resulted	 in	 4	 participants	
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data	being	removed	from	the	analysis.	
3.6.2	Offline	task	The	offline	interpretation	measure	was	a	recognition	task	(based	on	Eysenck	et	al.,	(1991)	and	Mathews	&	Mackintosh	(2000)).	During	the	encoding	phase,	participants	read	10	scenarios.	Each	scenario	had	a	title	and	was	presented	one	line	as	a	time.	The	final	word	was	completed	as	a	word	 fragment	 (as	 described	 in	 the	 online	 task),	 but	 in	 this	 task	 the	scenario	remained	ambiguous	and	participants	were	not	asked	to	make	a	 quick	 judgement	 about	 what	 the	 word	 was.	 If	 they	 did	 not	 make	 a	decision	 within	 8	 seconds	 they	 heard	 an	 error	 tone	 and	 a	comprehension	 question	 appeared	 on	 the	 screen.	 	 To	 ensure	 that	participants	had	engaged	 in	 reading	 the	scenario,	once	 they	completed	the	 word	 fragment	 (or	 once	 the	 time	 limit	 was	 reached),	 they	 saw	 a	comprehension	 question	 requiring	 a	 yes/no	 answer.	 Once	 the	participant	had	seen	all	the	scenarios,	they	began	the	recognition	phase.	Here,	they	were	presented	with	the	title	of	the	previously	seen	scenario	and	 four	 ‘descriptions’	 of	 the	 scenario.	Two	descriptions	were	positive	or	negative	 ‘target’	sentences	and	matched	the	meaning	of	the	scenario	and	two	were	positive	and	negative	 ‘foil’	 sentences	(e.g.	 sentences	 that	match	 in	 valence	 to	 target	 sentences,	 but	 do	 not	 match	 a	 possible	interpretation).	 Participants	 are	 required	 to	 rate	 each	 sentence	 from	1	(very	 different	 in	 meaning)	 to	 4	 (very	 similar	 in	 meaning)	 as	 to	 how	related	the	meaning	is	to	the	original	scenario.		The	dependent	variable	is	mean	 ratings	 of	 target	 sentences	 e.g.	 a	mean	high	 rating	of	 negative	targets	 would	 suggest	 negative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ambiguous	scenarios	and	vice	versa	 for	positive	 target	 sentences.	Two	versions	of	this	 task	were	prepared	each	containing	different	ambiguous	scenarios	and	participants	 completed	 them	 in	 counterbalanced	order	before	 and	after	 the	 CBM-I	 manipulation.	 The	 recognition	 task	 as	 an	 offline	assessment	of	interpretation	bias	is	considered	to	be	relatively	free	from	demand	effects	and	selection	bias	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2016).		
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3.7	Interpretation	bias	manipulation	task	(CBM-I)	The	 CBM-I	 task	 employed	 100	 scenarios	 (10	 were	 test	 trials),	again	based	on	a	range	of	worry	domains	(Tallis,	Davey,	&	Bond,	1994),	but	 different	 scenarios	 to	 those	 seen	 in	 the	 online	 and	 offline	 tasks.	Scenarios	 were	 presented	 on	 a	 Lenovo	 laptop	 computer	 screen	 in	 5	blocks	 of	 18	 training	 scenarios	 and	 2	 test	 trials	 with	 a	 short	 break	offered	between	each	block.	Scenarios	were	based	on	those	devised	by	Krahé,	 Mathews,	Whyte	 and	 Hirsch	 (2016).	 Scenarios	 were	 presented	over	 headphones	 (cf.	 Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2009)	 and	 remained	 ambiguous	 in	valence	 until	 the	 final	 word.	 Scenarios	 were	 presented	 aurally	 as	previous	 research	 has	 suggested	 that	 training	 scenarios	 presented	 in	auditory	rather	than	text	format	better	maintain	participant	interest	and	concentration	 (Holmes,	 Mathews,	 Dalgleish,	 &	 Mackintosh,	 2006).	 An	example	benign	scenario	that	the	participants	heard	is	“You	have	taken	an	exam	as	part	of	an	evening	course	and	feel	you	did	well.	At	the	next	class	the	grades	are	on	the	notice-board	and	everyone	is	looking	at	them.	The	thought	of	others	comparing	your	grade	with	theirs	makes	you	feel	happy”.	 After	 participants	 heard	 each	 scenario,	 they	 saw	 a	comprehension	 question	 on	 a	 computer	 screen	 (e.g.	 “Were	 you	 upset	that	 others	 could	 compare	 their	 grade	with	 yours?”). Once	 a	 response	was	detected	 a	 feedback	message	was	provided	 for	1000ms.	 If	 correct	the	answer	remained	on	the	screen	under	the	question	and	if	incorrect	a	short	 tone	 was	 heard	 and	 the	 correct	 response	 appeared	 below	 the	question.	 If	 the	 participant	 did	 not	 respond	 a	 message	 “no	 response	detected	 “	 appeared	 and	 the	 next	 trial	 started.	 	 In	 the	 benign	 training	group	participants	always	heard	scenarios	with	a	benign	outcome	and	in	the	 sham	 training	 (control	 condition)	 participants	 heard	 50%	 of	scenarios	with	a	benign	outcome	and	50%	with	a	negative	outcome.		3.8	Worry	breathing	focus	task		To	 assess	whether	 there	was	 a	 transfer	 effect	 of	 CBM-I	 training	onto	a	worry	task,	participants	also	completed	a	worry	breathing	focus	task.	The	task	is	based	in	a	behavioural	measure	of	worry	developed	by	
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Borkovec,	 Robinson,	 Pruzinsky,	 and	 	 DePree	 (1983)	 and	 Ruscio	 &	Borkovec	(2004)	and	previously	used	as	an	assessment	of	far	transfer	of	CBM-I	on	worry	symptoms	(e.g.	Hayes,	Hirsch,	Krebs,	&	Mathews,	2010;	Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 The	 current	 version	 of	 the	 task	 had	 2	 phases,	 a	 5	minute	worry	period	and	a	5	minute	breathing	focus	period.	During	the	worry	 period	 participants	were	 instructed	 to	 think	 of	 a	 current	worry	topic.	This	was	briefly	discussed	with	the	experimenter	to	ensure	that	it	was	related	to	a	potentially	negative	future	situation.	The	experimenter	wrote	down	a	brief	summary	of	the	worry	topic	and	the	participant	was	asked	 to	 silently	 worry	 about	 this	 topic	 for	 5	 minutes	 and	 the	experimenter	left	the	room	during	this	time.		During	the	breathing	focus	period	 participants	 were	 instructed	 to	 focus	 on	 their	 breathing	 and	every	 20-30	 seconds	 a	 computer-generated	 tone	 would	 sound.	 There	were	12	tones	 in	each	breathing	 focus	period.	At	 the	 tone,	participants	were	 asked	whether	 their	 attention	was	 focused	 in	 their	 breathing	 or	whether	 their	mind	 had	wandered.	 If	 they	 had	 experienced	 a	 thought	intrusion,	they	were	asked	whether	the	valence	of	the	thought	intrusion	was	negative,	neutral	or	positive	 in	 content	and	 for	a	brief	description	e.g.	“negative	–	upcoming	exams”.	At	the	end	of	the	breathing	focus	task	participants	 completed	 two	 visual	 analogue	 scales	 (rating	 from	0-100)	asking	 them	 to	 estimate	 the	 percentage	 of	 time	 they	 focused	 on	 their	breathing	during	the	5	minute	period	and	how	difficult	it	was	to	focus	on	their	breathing.	At	 the	end	of	 the	 task,	participants	were	asked	 to	 rate	the	extent	 	 to	which	 they	were	able	 to	 focus	on	 their	breathing	during	the	task	(where	0%	was	not	at	all	and	100%	was	all	of	the	time)	and	the	extent	 to	which	 they	 had	 difficulty	 focusing	 on	 their	 breathing	 (where	0%	was	not	at	all	difficult	and	100%	extremely	difficult).		3.9	Procedure	Participants	completed	an	online	screening	phase	that	consisted	of	a	 study	 information	sheet,	 consent	 to	complete	 the	screening	phase,	the	PSWQ,	 the	STAI-Y2	trait	anxiety	questions	and	screening	questions	(see	 above).	 If	 participants	met	 the	 study	 inclusion	 criteria	 they	were	
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invited	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 study.	 Within	 24	 hours	 prior	 to	 their	participation	of	 the	study	participants	completed	an	online	assessment	of	worry	and	anxiety	(PSWQ	and	STAI-Y2	trait	questions).	On	arrival	at	the	 laboratory,	 participants	 completed	 a	 consent	 form	 and	 then	completed	 VAS	 mood	 ratings	 (sadness,	 anxiety,	 happiness),	 they	 then	completed	 a	 5-minute	 resting	 state	HRV	 assessment.	 Participants	 then	completed	 the	 baseline	 online	 then	 offline	 interpretation	 assessment	bias	 tasks.	 At	 this	 point	 participants	 were	 randomised	 to	 either	 the	benign	or	 control	 training	 condition.	Participants	 completed	 the	CBM-I	training	(benign	training	or	sham	training),	further	mood	measures	and	another	 5	 minute	 resting	 state	 HRV	 assessment.	 Finally,	 participants	were	 provided	 with	 instructions	 for	 the	 worry	 breathing	 focus	 task.	They	 practiced	 the	 breathing	 focus	 section	 of	 the	 task	 and	 provided	 3	practice	 examples	 of	 their	 thoughts	 in	 45	 seconds.	 Once	 they	 had	understood	the	task,	they	completed	the	worry	period	and	the	breathing	focus	task.	After	all	study	tasks	were	complete,	participants	completed	a	short	questionnaire	to	ascertain	whether	they	know	what	the	purpose	of	the	study	was	and	to	rule	 in/out	demand	effects	 (see	Appendix	2	 for	a	copy	 of	 the	 questionnaire).	 Participants	were	 then	 debriefed	 as	 to	 the	purpose	of	 the	study,	 thanked	 for	 their	 time	and	completed	a	payment	form	for	£20.		
4.	RESULTS		Effect	sizes	are	reported	using	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	r	as	an	effect	size	measure	and	partial	eta	squared	ηp2.	Using	Cohen’s	(1988)	criteria,	 a	 small	 effect	 size	 is	 reflected	by	an	r	of	 .10,	medium	by	 .30,	and	 large	 by	 .50.	 Using	 partial	 eta	 squared,	 a	 small	 effect	 size	 is	reflected	 by	 a	 measure	 of	 .01,	 medium	 by	 .06,	 and	 large	 by	 .14	(Stevens,	2002)	4.1	Baseline	trait	and	anxiety,	worry,	and	mood	measures		Trait	worry	 as	measured	by	 the	PSWQ	 (Meyer	 et	 al.,	 1990)	was	M	 =	65.78,	SD	=	6.79	in	the	whole	sample	(N	=	49).	There	was	no	significant	difference	in	PSWQ	scores	between	the	benign	(M	=	67.68,	SD	=	6.81)	and	the	control	(M	=	64.92,	SD	=	5.52)	conditions,	t(47)	=	1.56,	p	=	.13.	
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PSWQ	 scores	 in	 at	 baseline	 were	 also	 significantly	 negatively	correlated	 with	 baseline	 HRV,	 r	 =	 -.33,	 p	 =	 .02.	 Thus	 as	 one	 would	expect,	higher	HRV	at	baseline	was	associated	with	lower	trait	worry.	Trait	anxiety	as	measured	by	the	STAI-Y2	trait	questions	(Spielberger	et	al.,	1983)	was	M	=	49.32,	SD	=	3.45	in	the	whole	sample	and	STAI-Y2	trait	scores	did	not	differ	between	the	benign	CBM-I	(M	=	49.92,	SD	=	2.98)	and	control	(M	=	48.75,	SD	=	3.85)	conditions,	t(47)	=	1.19	,	p	=	.24.	 There	 were	 no	 significant	 differences	 between	 self-reported	sadness,	anxiety,	or	happiness	at	baseline	between	the	two	conditions	(all	ps	>	.05).		4.2	CBM-I	training	task		
4.2.1	Accuracy	on	CBM-I	training	task	and	sham	control	task	Comprehension	 questions	 presented	 after	 each	 training	scenario	 required	 participants	 to	 select	 the	 correct	 “yes/no”	 answer.	The	CBM-I	 condition	had	93.07%	accuracy	 and	 the	 control	 condition	had	91.46%	accuracy.	There	was	no	significant	difference	in	accuracy	
t(46)	=	1.49,	p	=	>	.05	between	the	two	conditions.		
4.2.2	Bias	assessment	during	training	using	test	trials		The	 number	 of	 ambiguous	 test	 trials	 resolved	 with	 a	 benign	interpretation	 (as	 opposed	 to	 a	 threat	 interpretation)	 were	significantly	greater	in	the	benign	(M	=	7.80,	SD	=	2.02)	as	compared	to	control	 (M	 =	 5.87,	 SD	 =	 1.46),	 training	 conditions	 t(462)	 =	 3.77,	 p	=	<.001,	 r	 =	 .49.	 This	 suggests	 that	 CBM-I	 training	 was	 successful	 in	training	 the	 benign	 (but	 not	 the	 control)	 condition	 to	 interpret	ambiguous	scenarios	in	a	benign	manner	within	the	training	task.		4.3	Self	report	mood	at	baseline	and	post	training		A	mixed	model	 ANOVA	was	 carried	 out	 on	 the	mood	 ratings3	recorded	 at	 the	 baseline	 phase	 and	 after	 the	 CBM-I	 training.	 The																																																									2	One	participant’s	training	data	was	deleted	in	error	3	Normality	was	assessed	using	the	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	test	(cf.	Field,	2009).	Of	12	potential	data	points,	9	were	normally	distributed.	The	decision	was	taken	not	to	transform	the	data.		
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between	 factor	 was	 training	 condition	 (benign	 vs.	 control)	 and	 the	repeated	measure	 factor	was	 time	 (baseline	vs.	post	CBM-I	 training).		On	sadness	ratings	there	was	a	no	main	effect	of	time	F	(1,47)	=	2.50,	p	=	.12,	ns.	There	was	no	main	effect	of	condition	F	(1,47)	=	.002,	p	=	.97,	
ns.	There	was	a	 significant	 interaction	effect,	F	(1,47)	=	4.64,	p	 =	 .04,	ηp2		=	 .09.	However,	post	hoc	 t-tests	revealed	no	significant	difference	between	 self-reported	 sadness	 at	 baseline	 between	 the	 benign	 and	control	condition	t(47)	=	.61,	p	=	.54,	ns	(benign	condition:	M	=	27.28,	
SD	=	 25.12	 vs.	 control	 condition:	M	 =	 23.33,	 SD	=	 19.43)	 or	 at	 post	CBM-I	training,	t(47)	=	.65,	p	=	.52,	ns	(benign	condition:	M	=	26.16,	SD	=	26.70	vs.	control	condition:	M	=	30.63,	SD	=	21.17).	When	conducted	on	anxiety	ratings	there	was	no	significant	main	effect	of	time,	F	(1,47)	=	2.24,	ns,	ηp2		=	.05,	no	significant	main	effect	of	condition	F	(1,47)	=	<	1,	ns,	ηp2		=	.001,	there	was	also	no	interaction	effect,	F	(1,47)	=	2.09,	ns,	ηp2		=	.04.	When	conducted	on	happiness	ratings	there	was	a	significant	main	effect	of	time,	F	(1,47)	=	7.98,	p	=	.007,	ηp2		=	.15	where	happiness	ratings	decreased	from	baseline	to	post	training		(baseline:	M	=	55.65,	
SE	=	25.12	vs.	post	CBM-I/sham	training:	M	=	51.71,	SE	=	2.80).	There	was	 no	 significant	main	 effect	 of	 condition,	 F	 (1,47)	 =	 <	 1,	 ns,	 ηp2	 	=	.009,	 nor	 any	 significant	 interaction	 between	 condition	 and	 time	 F	(1,47)	=	<	1,	ns,	ηp2		=	<	.001.		 In	summary,	 there	was	no	effect	of	CBM-I	or	sham	training	on	self	reported	sadness	and	anxiety.	There	was	a	significant	main	effect	of	 time	 for	 self	 reported	 happiness	 where,	 regardless	 of	 training	condition,	 participants	 reported	 a	 reduction	 in	 happiness	 from	baseline	to	post-training.		4.4	Interpretation	bias	assessment	using	online	task		
4.4.1	Task	completion	accuracy	During	the	online	task	when	resolving	the	final	word,	accuracy	in	entering	the	correct	letter	at	baseline	was	96.09%	and	post	training	was	97.83%	on	average	for	the	CBM-I	group,	and	96.28%	at	time	1	and	98.84%	 at	 time	 2	 on	 average	 for	 the	 sham	 training	 condition.	When	
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comparing	the	two	conditions	at	baseline	or	post-training,	there	were	no	significant	differences	(all	ps	>	.05).		
4.4.2	Online	bias	assessment	Analysis	of	online	task	data	was	performed	on	median	latencies	for	 correct	 responses	 to	 threat	 and	 non-threat	 stimuli	 (cf.	 Hirsch	 &	Mathews,	 1997),	 see	 Table	 1	 for	 reaction	 time	 (RT)	 data.	 An	examination	 of	 latencies	 at	 baseline	 assessment	 did	 not	 show	 any	difference	in	RT	to	threat	and	non-threat	words	t(44)	=	<	1,	ns,	r	=	.12.	To	examine	whether	CBM-I	training	had	an	effect	on	RT	to	threat	and	non-threat	stimuli	a	2(time:	pre	vs.	post	training)	x	2	(valence:	threat	vs.	 non-threat	 stimuli)	 x	 2	 (condition:	 benign	 training	 vs.	 sham	training)	 mixed	 model	 ANOVA	 was	 performed.	 There	 was	 no	significant	 main	 effect	 of	 time,	 F	 (1,42)	 =	 <	 1,	 ns,	 ηp2	 	 =	 .007,	 no	significant	 main	 effect	 of	 valence,	 F	 (1,42)	 =	 2.06,	 ns,	 ηp2	 	 =	 .05,	 no	significant	main	effect	of	condition,	F	(1,42)	=	<	1,	ns,	ηp2		=	<	.001	and	no	 significant	 interaction	 effect,	 F	 (1,42)	 =	 <	 1,	 ns,	 ηp2	 	=	 .01.	 	 There	were	also	no	other	significant	effects.																Table	1			Means	and	standard	deviations	in	parentheses	of	the	median	reaction	times	to	threat	and	non-threat	word	fragments																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																															Stimuli	type		 CBM-I	 training	 	 (n	=	22)	 	Sham	 training	 (n	=	22)	Time	1	Non-threat	 751.55	(283.31)	 783.41	(218.83)	Time	1	Threat	 757.93	(280.56)	 752.75	(227.59)	Time	2	Non-threat	 794.68	(229.58)	 788.50	(248.58)	Time	2	Threat		 773.80	(217.62)	 764.59	(230.16)	
	4.5	Interpretation	bias	assessment	using	offline	task	There	was	no	baseline	difference	between	responses	to	positive	(M	=	2.60,	SD	=	0.41)	and	negative	(M	=	2.45,	SD	=	0.49)	targets	e.g.	no	indication	of	 a	 general	 negative	bias,	 t(47)	=	1.50,	ns,	 	r	=	 .21.	 It	was	
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predicted	that	after	CBM-I	 training,	participants	who	received	benign	training	would	endorse	more	non-threat	targets	than	threat	targets.	It	was	 also	 predicted	 that	 all	 participants	 would	 endorse	 more	 target	sentences	than	foils	sentences	 indicating	that	they	were	not	choosing	responses	at	random.	A	mixed	ANOVA4	was	performed	with	condition	(CBM-I	 vs.	 sham	 training)	 as	 the	 between-group	 factor	 and	 three	repeated	 measures	 factors	 of	 time	 (pre	 vs.	 post	 training),	 valence	(threat	vs.	non-threat),	and	target	(possible	interpretation	vs.	foil).	See	Table	2	for	mean	recognition	test	ratings	by	each	condition.		There	was	a	large	significant	main	effect	of	valence,	F	(1,45)	=	307.75,	p	=	<	.001,	ηp2	=	.87,	indicating	that	non-threat	sentences	(M	=	2.52,	SE	=	0.4)	were	endorsed	significantly	more	than	threat	sentences	were	(M	=	1.68,	SE	=	0.5).	There	was	also	a	significant	main	effect	of	target,	F	(1,45)	=	12.61,	




Table	2	Mean	recognition	ratings	by	each	condition	for	threat	and	non-threat	target	sentences	and	foil	sentences			 CBM-I	 training	 (n	=	23)	 Sham	training	(n	=	24)	Time	1	Non-threat	Target	 2.64	(0.42)	 2.55	(0.41)	Time	 1	 Threat	Target	 	2.39	(0.42)	 2.50	(0.46)	Time	1	Non-threat	Foil	 1.60	(0.43)	 1.81	(0.36)	Time	1	Threat	Foil	 	1.58	(0.48)	 1.73	(0.36)		Time	2	Non-threat	Target	 2.67	(0.50)	 	2.78	(0.50)	Time	 2	 Threat	Target	 2.27	(0.46)	 2.35	(0.45)	Time	2	Non-threat	Foil	 1.77	(0.60)	 1.83	(0.49)	Time	2	Threat	Foil	 1.57	(0.47)	 1.58	(0.38)		4.6	Heart	Rate	Variability		It	 was	 predicted	 that	 those	 in	 the	 benign	 training	 condition	would	 have	 higher	 HRV	 after	 training	 than	 those	 in	 the	 control	condition.		A	mixed	condition	(CBM-I/Sham	training)	x	time	(pre/post	training)	Analysis	of	Covariance	(ANCOVA)	was	carried	out	on	HRV	at	baseline	(time	1)	and	straight	after	the	CBM-I	training	(time	2)	where	BMI	and	age	were	 included	as	covariates	 in	 the	model.	There	was	no	significant	 main	 effect	 of	 time,	 F	 (1,43)	 =	 1.13,	 ns,	 ηp2	 	 =	 .03,	 or	 a	significant	main	effect	of	condition,	F	(1,43)	=	1.35,	ns,	ηp2		=	.03.	There	was	a	significant	condition	x	time	interaction,	F	(1,43)	=	4.18,	p	=	.05,	ηp2		=	.09.	Post-hoc	pairwise	comparisons	show	a	significant	increase	in	
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HRV	from	baseline	(M	=	37.09,	SD	=	18.03)	to	post	CBM-I	training	(M	=	48.09,	SD	=	24.52),	t(24)	=	3.95,	p	=	.001,	r	=	.58	in	the	benign	training	condition.	There	was	no	significant	change	in	HRV	from	baseline	(M	=	34.67,	SD	=	12.32)	to	post	sham-training	(M	=	37.46,	SD	=	15.80)	in	the	control	condition	t(22)	=	1.27,	ns,	r	=	.26.			 As	 an	 exploratory	 measure	 correlations	 were	 performed	between	HRV	at	resting	state	2	(post	training)	and	outcome	variables.	There	 was	 a	 significant	 negative	 correlation	 between	 HRV	 and	 post	training	negative	 targets	 in	 the	benign	 training	condition,	 r	=	 -.48,	p	=	.02	 but	 not	 the	 sham	 training	 condition.	 This	 suggests	 that	 in	 the	benign	training	condition	higher	HRV	at	resting	state	2	was	associated	with	 fewer	 endorsements	 of	 negative	 targets	 in	 the	 offline	 task	 post	CBM-I	training.			4.7	Far	transfer:	Worry	breathing	focus	task	It	 was	 hypothesised	 that	 there	 would	 be	 less	 negative	intrusions	experienced	by	participants	 in	 the	benign	CBM-I	condition	as	 compared	 to	 the	 sham	condition.	Data	was	assessed	 for	normality	and	the	number	of	negative	intrusions	in	the	benign	training	condition	was	found	to	be	normally	distributed,	but	data	for	this	variable	in	the	control	 condition	was	not	normally	distributed.	A	 log	 transformation	was	 applied	 to	 the	 data	 (Field,	 2009)	 and	 this	 resulted	 in	 correction	whereby	 the	 control	 condition	 now	 had	 normally	 distributed	 data.	Unfortunately	as	a	result	of	the	applied	correction,	the	CBM-I	training	condition	had	non-normally	distributed	data.	The	decision	was	 taken	to	 use	 the	 original	 non-transformed	 data	 and	 consequently,	 due	 to	non-normality	 in	 the	 control	 condition,	 these	 findings	 should	 be	interpreted	 with	 caution.	 An	 independent	 t-test	 indicated	 that	 there	was	 no	 significant	 difference	 in	 number	 of	 negative	 intrusions	experienced	in	each	condition,	t(465)	=	<	1,	p	=	ns,	r	=	.09	(CBM-I	group	
M	=	2.48,	SD	=	1.98	and	sham	training	condition	M	=	2.17,	SD	=	2.01).	There	was	no	significant	difference	between	ratings	of	the	percentage																																																									5	One	participant	could	not	complete	the	breathing	focus	task	due	to	a	technical	difficulty.		
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of	 time	 the	 two	 conditions	 reported	 being	 able	 to	 focus	 on	 their	breathing	during	 the	 task,	 sham	training	condition	=	57%	and	CBM-I	training	 condition	 =	 56	 %,	 p	 =	 .84.	 There	 was	 also	 no	 significant	difference	in	ratings	of	difficulty	focusing	on	breathing	during	the	task,	sham	training	condition	=	47%	and	CBM-I	training	condition	=	57	%,	p	=	.16.		4.8	Debrief	questionnaire	data	In	 response	 to	 the	 question	 “what	 did	 you	 think	 was	 the	purpose	 of	 the	 experiment?”	 only	 8%	 of	 participants	 identified	 the	study	 as	 examining	 response	 times	 to	 positive	 and	 negative	interpretations	of	ambiguous	scenarios.	None	of	the	participants	made	a	 link	 between	 the	 bias	 assessment	 tasks,	 the	 CBM-I/sham	 training	and	 the	 post	 training	 biases	 assessments.	 Furthermore,	 none	 of	 the	participants	 made	 a	 link	 between	 the	 CBM-I/sham	 training	 and	 the	worry	breathing	focus	task.	
5.	DISCUSSION		5.1	Overview	and	discussion	of	findings		 The	 aim	 of	 this	 study	was	 to	 extend	 knowledge	 of	 the	 role	 of	interpretation	 biases	 in	 the	 onset	 and	 maintenance	 of	 pathological	worry.	Previous	research	indicates	that	individuals	high	in	trait	worry	demonstrate	threat	interpretation	biases	at	the	offline,	reflective	stage	of	 information	 processing	 (Eysenck	 et	 al.	 1991;	 Mathews	 &	Mackintosh,	2000;	Salemink	&	van	den	Hout,	2010).	The	study	sought	to	examine	whether	threat	interpretation	of	ambiguous	scenarios	also	occurred	 at	 a	 reflexive,	 online	 stage	 of	 processing.	 Regarding	Hypothesis	 1,	 the	 CBM-I	 training	 appeared	 to	 be	 successful	 in	 that	participants	 in	 the	CBM-I	 training	 group	endorsed	 significantly	more	benign	outcomes	on	 the	 test	 trials	during	 training	 than	did	 the	sham	training	group	(cf.	Hayes	et	al.,	2010).	However,	there	was	no	effect	of	training	on	 the	online	or	offline	outcome	measures,	 possible	 reasons	for	this	will	be	discussed	below.	Hypothesis	2	was	supported.	Results	indicated	a	significant	increase	in	HRV	in	the	benign	training	condition,	but	 not	 in	 the	 sham	 training	 condition	 and	 this	 was	 independent	 of	
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mood	 change.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 significant	 negative	 correlation	between	 HRV	 post	 training	 (but	 not	 at	 baseline)	 and	 number	 of	negative	 target	 endorsements	 in	 the	 offline	 recognition	 task	 in	 the	benign	 condition	 but	 not	 the	 sham	 condition.	 This	 suggests	 that	 an	increase	 in	 HRV	 is	 associated	with	 fewer	 negative	 interpretations	 of	ambiguous	 scenarios	 at	 an	 offline	 stage	 of	 processing.	 Finally,	 there	was	no	support	 for	Hypothesis	3.	There	was	no	significant	difference	in	number	of	negative	thought	intrusions	in	the	worry	breathing	focus	task	 by	 the	 CBM-I	 condition	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 sham	 training	condition.			 	A	key	question	is	thus	why	was	there	no	evidence	of	the	CBM-I	benign	training	procedure	on	the	online	and	offline	interpretation	bias	assessment	 tasks?	 CBM-I	 training	 appeared	 to	 be	 successful,	 in	 that	those	in	the	benign	training	condition	made	significantly	more	benign	interpretations	 in	 the	 test	 trials	 than	 those	 in	 the	 sham	 condition.	However,	 training	 effects	 did	 not	 transfer	 onto	 the	 online	 or	 offline	interpretation	bias	assessment	tasks.	There	is	little	previous	literature	examining	 online	 interpretation	 bias	 tasks	 in	 a	 high	 trait	 worry	population.	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	 the	 interpretation	 bias	 does	 not	occur	 at	 the	 online	 stage.	However,	 information	 processing	 biases	 in	pathological	 worry	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 to	 some	 extent	 automatic	 in	nature	 (e.g.	 Hirsch	 &	 Mathews,	 2012).	 There	 is	 evidence	 for	 the	automaticity	of	 interpretation	biases	 in	 social	anxiety	disorder	 (SAD)	where	 individuals	with	SAD	made	less	positive	online	 interpretations	than	 participants	 without	 SAD	 (Hirsch	 &	 Mathews,	 2000).	 Using	 a	similar	 word	 fragment	 task	 to	 the	 online	 task	 used	 in	 the	 present	study,	 Salemink	 and	 van	 den	 Hout	 (2010)	 found	 an	 effect	 of	 CBM-I	training	 on	 reaction	 time	 with	 those	 who	 received	 positive	 training	being	 significantly	 faster	 to	 solve	 positive	 than	 negative	 word	fragments.	Salemink	and	van	den	Hout	(2010)	reported	a	trend	effect	with	 a	 small	 effect	 size	 (p	 =	 .09,	 d	 =	 .22)	 for	 the	 negatively	 trained	group	 to	be	 faster	 to	 identify	negative	 than	positive	word	 fragments.	However,	the	effect	in	the	negative	condition	is	arguably	weak.	Despite	
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the	fact	that	this	task	was	not	purposefully	speeded	like	the	one	in	the	present	study,	the	mean	reaction	times	in	the	negatively	and	positively	trained	 groups	 were	 below	 2000ms,	 which	 suggest	 that	 inferences	may	 have	 been	 made	 relatively	 spontaneously.	 Key	 differences	between	the	Salemink	and	van	den	Hout	(2010)	study	and	the	present	one	 is	 that	 they	 trained	 non	 high	 anxious	 participants	 to	 adopt	 a	positive	 or	 negative	 interpretation	 bias,	 whereas	 the	 present	 study	training	 high	 trait	 worry	 participants	 to	 adopt	 a	 benign	 bias,	 which	was	then	compared	to	a	sham	training	group.	One	possibility	is	that	a	different	 participant	 population	 may	 respond	 differently	 to	 CBM-I	training.	Arguably,	one	is	also	likely	to	observe	a	greater	difference	in	reaction	time	to	positive	and	negative	words	when	groups	have	been	explicitly	 trained	 to	 interpret	 ambiguity	 in	 a	 positive	 or	 negative	manner	rather	than	examining	benign	CBM-I	training	as	compared	to	a	sham	training	condition.			 A	 second	 possibility	 as	 to	 why	 there	 was	 no	 effect	 of	 CBM-I	training	on	the	online	task	is	that	the	task	was	not	a	sensitive	measure	of	spontaneous	 inferences.	As	noted	above,	pilot	 testing	of	 the	online	task	 materials	 was	 conducted	 to	 identify	 ambiguous	 scenarios	 that	differentiated	 high	 and	 low	 worriers	 in	 their	 interpretation	 of	 the	scenario.	 However,	 of	 the	 120	 scenarios	 assessed,	 only	 27	 scenarios	were	 found	 to	be	significantly	 related	 to	 trait	worry	and	 tendency	 to	provide	 positive	 and	 negative	 responses.	 Thus	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	scenarios	were	 based	 on	 these	 exemplar	 scenarios,	 but	were	 not	 re-piloted	 due	 to	 time	 constraints.	 This	 may	 have	 meant	 that	 the	scenarios	were	not	a	sensitive	measure	of	negative	and	positive	online	inference	generation.			 Previous	literature	has	found	that	training	participants	to	make	positive	interpretations	of	ambiguous	scenarios	has	had	a	causal	effect	on	interpretation	as	measured	by	an	offline	recognition	test	(Mathews	&	 Mackintosh,	 2000;	 Salemink	 &	 van	 den	 Hout,	 2010).	 The	 present	study	 did	 not	 find	 a	 causal	 effect	 of	 benign	 training	 on	 negative	 or	positive	 targets	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 sham	 training	 group.	 Both	 the	
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previous	 studies	 that	 used	 this	 task	 used	 non	 high	 anxious	 samples	and	one	possibility	is	that	the	CBM-I	training	was	less	effective	for	this	population.	 However	 this	 seems	 unlikely	 given	 that	 Hirsch	 et	 al.	(2009)	and	Hayes	et	al.	(2010)	have	used	CBM-I	training	in	a	high	trait	worry	sample	and	a	GAD	sample	and	 found	an	effect	of	 training	on	a	far	 transfer	 worry	 breathing	 focus	 task.	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	completing	this	task	twice	(although	with	novel	scenarios	each	time),	once	 at	 baseline	 and	 once	 post	 CBM-I	 induction	 affected	 the	 way	participants	responded	to	the	task	when	completing	it	the	second	time	that	interfered	with	training	effects.	However,	none	of	the	participants	highlighted	 this	 in	 the	 debrief	 questionnaire.	 A	 second	 possibility	 is	that	time	from	training	to	completion	of	the	offline	task	was	too	 long	and	 that	 completing	 the	 HRV	 resting	 state	 and	 the	 online	 task	 first	diluted	 the	 effects	 of	 training.	 Again	 this	 seems	 unlikely	 as	 CBM	training	 prior	 to	 watching	 a	 traumatic	 film	 was	 found	 to	 reduce	distress	 over	 the	 next	 week	 (Woud,	 Postma,	 Holmes,	 &	 Mackintosh,	2013),	 suggesting	 that	 CBM	 training	 effects	 can	 be	 relatively	 long-lived.			 A	 further	 noteworthy	 point	 is	 to	 consider	why	 there	were	 no	group	differences	between	the	CBM-I	training	condition	and	the	sham	training	 control	 condition.	 The	 control	 condition	 received	 training	where	they	were	exposed	to	scenarios	that	were	ambiguous	until	the	final	word	and	here	the	final	word	stimuli	were	50%	benign	and	50%	threat	 relevant	 (cf.	 Hayes	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Hirsch	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 One	possibility	is	that	experiencing	training	where	50%	of	the	stimuli	were	positive	actually	gave	them	a	dose	of	positive	training.	As	highlighted	by	Menne-Lothmann	et	al.	(2014)	and	discussed	by	Hirsch	et	al.	(2016)	sham	 training	 has	 previously	 been	 found	 to	 result	 in	 a	 small,	 but	significant	 reduction	 in	 negative	mood	 and	 thus	 this	 type	 of	 control	training	may	 be	more	 active	 than	 expected.	However,	 in	 the	 present	study	 there	 was	 no	 effect	 of	 sham	 training	 on	 mood.	 Furthermore,	even	 if	 the	 sham	 training	 condition	 did	 provide	 some	 active	 benign	training,	one	might	still	expect	to	see	significant	pre	–	post	changes	on	
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bias	 assessment	 measures	 in	 the	 CBM-I	 group	 and	 this	 was	 not	observed.		 HRV	 data	 indicated	 that	 the	 benign	 CBM-I	 training	 condition	experienced	a	significant	increase	in	HRV	from	pre-post	training	than	the	 sham	 training	 condition.	 This	 is	 an	 interesting	 finding	 as	 (to	 the	author’s	 knowledge)	 it	 is	 the	 first	 time	 that	 HRV	 has	 been	 assessed	before	 and	 after	 CBM-I	 training	 in	 a	 high	 trait	 worry	 population.	Grisham,	Becker,	Williams,	Whitton	and	Makkar	(2014)	measured	HRV	when	 using	 CBM	 to	 reduce	 responsibility	 in	 a	 high-checking	 student	sample.	 They	 reported	 that	 participants	 who	 received	 positive	 CBM	training	 showed	 increased	 HRV	 from	 a	 baseline	 measure	 to	 a	 post-training	 measure.	 Grisham	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 suggest	 that	 increased	 HRV	may	represent	a	more	adaptive	physiological	responding	to	a	stressor	task	 that	 was	 completed	 by	 participants	 post	 CBM-I	 training.	 In	 the	present	study	a	significant	pre-post	CBM-I	induction	shift	in	HRV	in	the	benign	 training	 condition	 but	 not	 the	 sham	 training	 condition	 may	represent	a	shift	to	responding	to	ambiguity	in	a	more	flexible	manner	as	opposed	 to	a	more	 ridged	 response	 style	 that	 is	 likely	 typical	of	 a	high	 trait	worry	sample.	Unfortunately	 the	observed	shift	 in	HRV	did	not	result	in	a	causal	impact	on	near	or	far	transfer	tasks.	If	increased	HRV	 is	 associated	 with	 more	 adaptive	 cognitive	 responses	 to	emotional	stimuli	 (e.g.	Park	&	Thayer,	2014),	one	may	have	expected	to	see	less	negative	intrusions	after	a	worry	period	in	the	benign	CBM-I	 condition	as	 compared	 to	 the	 sham	 training	condition,	but	 this	was	not	 the	 case.	 In	 the	 benign	 training	 condition	 (but	 not	 the	 sham	condition)	there	was	a	negative	correlation	between	HRV	post	training	and	number	of	negative	 targets	 in	 the	offline	 task	post	 training.	This	does	 suggest	 that	 there	may	be	 some	 relationship	between	HRV	and	responding	to	ambiguous	scenarios.	However,	this	is	correlational	data	and	 causal	 relationships	 cannot	 be	 implied	 and	 there	 may	 be	 other	factors	that	are	influencing	this	association,	thus	replication	would	be	warranted	before	any	firm	conclusions	can	be	drawn.		
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	 There	was	no	effect	of	benign	CBM-I	training	on	the	far	transfer	worry	 breathing	 focus	 task.	 As	 there	 was	 no	 near	 transfer	 effect	 of	CBM-I	training,	it	is	unsurprising	that	there	was	no	far	transfer	affect.	Previous	research	using	a	high	trait	worry	sample	had	found	an	effect	of	benign	CBM-I	training	on	the	worry	breathing	focus	task	(Hirsch	et	al.,	 2009)	 with	 the	 benign	 training	 group	 reporting	 fewer	 negative	thought	 intrusions	 after	 a	 worry	 period	 than	 the	 sham	 training	condition.	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	 completing	 the	 online	 and	 offline	tasks	prior	 to	 the	worry	breathing	 focus	task	somehow	influenced	or	diluted	 the	original	CBM-I	 training	effect.	A	 second	possibility	 is	 that	the	 study	 was	 underpowered.	 This	 however	 seems	 unlikely	 as	 the	power	experiment	had	an	adequate	sample	size	to	achieve	80%	power	with	an	alpha	of	.05.	The	power	calculation	for	the	study	was	based	on	data	from	the	breathing	focus	task	from	the	Hirsch	et	al.	(2009)	study	and	 thus	 should	 be	 representative	 of	 hypothesised	 effects	 in	 the	present	study.			 Finally,	a	discussion	of	why	the	online	and	offline	tasks	did	not	indicate	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 negative	 interpretation	 bias	 at	 baseline	 is	warranted.	One	possibility	(as	noted	above)	is	that	the	online	task	was	not	a	 sensitive	assessment	of	 the	presence	of	 interpretation	bias	and	thus	 no	 negative	 bias	 was	 observed	 on	 this	 measure	 at	 baseline.	However,	 there	 was	 also	 no	 baseline	 negative	 bias	 observed	 on	 the	offline	recognition	task	and	(based	on	previous	research)	this	was	not	predicted.	 Data	 from	 previous	 research	 using	 the	 recognition	 task	(Eysenck	et	al.,	1991)	found	that	participants	with	GAD,	but	not	those	who	had	recovered	from	GAD	or	a	non-anxious	control	group	showed	a	significant	bias	 in	their	 interpretation	of	ambiguous	sentences.	This	suggests	 that	 naturally	 occurring	 interpretation	 biases	 may	 only	 be	observable	 in	 clinical	 populations	 rather	 than	 sub-clinical	 high	 trait	worry	 populations.	 One	 recent	 suggestion	 to	 improve	 successful	facilitation	 of	 cognitive	 bias	 training	 is	 to	 activate	 the	 bias	 prior	 to	training	by	asking	participants	to	engage	in	worry	(Hirsch	et	al.,	2016).	It	 is	 possible	 that	 by	 activating	 worry	 prior	 to	 assessing	 the	 bias	 at	
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baseline,	we	may	have	observed	a	negative	bias.	However,	this	would	need	 to	be	 examined	 in	 a	 future	 study.	This	does	of	 course	 raise	 the	issue	 of	 how	much	 change	 one	might	 expect	 to	 see	 from	baseline	 to	post	 CBM-I	 training	 on	 a	 task,	 if	 the	 negative	 bias	 was	 not	 initially	observed.	One	possibility	 is	 that	as	 there	was	no	observable	negative	bias	 at	 baseline,	 this	 explains	why	 there	was	no	 effect	 of	 training	on	the	online	and	offline	tasks.	However,	despite	the	fact	that	bias	was	not	observed	at	baseline,	the	test	trial	data	suggested	that	the	training	task	trained	 a	 shift	 toward	 a	 benign	 bias	 (in	 the	 experimental	 condition)	and	 there	was	 a	 significant	 effect	 of	 training	 on	 the	HRV	 data.	 Thus,	despite	the	lack	of	evidence	for	a	negative	bias	at	baseline,	one	might	still	expect	 to	see	an	effect	of	 training	a	benign	bias	 from	pre	 to	post	training	on	data.	Certainly	an	experiment	(Hirsch	et	al.	2009)	using	a	similar	method	where	 a	 high	 trait	worry	population	 received	benign	training	 or	 sham	 training	 showed	 that	 benign	 training	 had	 a	subsequent	 effect	 on	 number	 of	 negative	 intrusions	 in	 a	 worry	breathing	 focus	 task.	 Arguably,	 if	 we	 have	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that		benign	 interpretation	 bias	 training	 induces	 a	 shift	 towards	 a	 benign	bias	in	an	experimental	group	(that	is	not	observed	from	sham	training	in	a	control	group),	 then	we	can	still	attempt	to	observe	whether	the	training	affects	change	at	the	online	of	offline	stages	of	processing.		5.1	Limitations	There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 limitations	 to	 the	 present	 study.	 One	possibility	 is	 that	 no	 effect	 of	 CBM-I	 training	 was	 found	 on	 the	recognition	task	due	to	dilution	of	training	effect	when	first	completing	the	online	task.	While	this	seems	unlikely,	one	possibility	would	have	been	 to	 counterbalance	 the	 order	 of	 the	 online	 and	 offline	 tasks	 at	baseline	and	after	CBM-I	such	that	half	the	participants	completed	the	offline	task	first	and	online	task	second.	This	option	was	discussed	by	the	 study	 team,	 but	 as	 the	 experiment	 already	 involved	counterbalancing	 the	 stimuli	 lists	 A	 and	 B	 for	 the	 online	 and	 offline	task,	 it	 was	 felt	 that	 this	 would	 be	 an	 additional	 layer	 of	 potential	
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complication.	 Furthermore,	 even	 if	 there	was	an	effect	of	 training	on	the	offline	task	when	presented	directly	after	training,	the	experiment	would	 be	 underpowered	 as	 only	 50%	 of	 participants	would	 see	 this	task	 directly	 after	 training.	 A	 second	 limitation	 is	 that	 the	 scenarios	used	in	the	online	task	(as	discussed	above)	were	not	re-piloted	due	to	time	constraints.	 It	 is	 thus	possible	 that	 the	 task	was	not	sensitive	 to	online	 assessment	 on	 interpretation	 bias.	 Finally,	 participants	 were	not	asked	to	rate	the	amount	of	time	they	were	able	to	worry	or	how	difficult	 they	 found	 to	 worry	 in	 the	 worry	 breathing	 focus	 task	 (cf.	Hirsch	et	al.	2009).	This	means	that	there	was	no	manipulation	check	for	the	worry	section	of	the	worry	breathing	focus	task.		5.2	Future	directions	
	 This	experiment	was	unable	 to	provide	conclusive	evidence	 in	support	of	an	online	or	offline	interpretation	bias	in	a	high	trait	worry	sample.	Future	research	in	this	area	could	seek	to	improve	the	online	task	by	performing	 further	pilot	work	and	ensuring	all	 scenarios	 are	sensitive	 to	both	plausible	negative	 and	positive	outcomes.	Hirsch	 et	al.	 (2016)	 suggest	 the	 use	 of	 biological	 paradigms	 such	 as	 Event	Related	 Potential	 (ERP)	 techniques	 to	 further	 explore	 online	inferences	that	may	occur	outside	of	awareness.	ERP	techniques	would	be	a	useful	addition	to	the	present	experiment	in	order	to	provide	an	insight	into	automatic	inferences.	Future	work	in	this	area	should	also	attempt	to	replicate	the	HRV	assessment	in	order	to	confirm	whether	this	is	a	robust	effect	in	CBM-I	training	in	a	high	trait	worry	sample.	If	indeed	HRV	is	a	biomarker	of	worry	(Chalmers	et	al.,	2016)	it	would	be	interesting	 to	 see	 whether	 in	 future	 experiments	 the	 relationship	between	benign	CBM-I	training	and	HRV	can	be	replicated.	CBM-I	is	a	widely	 used	 method	 of	 manipulating	 interpretation	 biases	 (Menne-Lothmann	 et	 al.,	 2014).	However,	 there	 is	 individual	 variation	 in	 the	degree	 to	which	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 alter	 their	 processing	 biases	(Clarke	et	al.	2012).	If	CBM-I	techniques	are	to	continue	to	develop	and	to	be	harnessed	as	effective	treatment	methods,	it	would	be	crucial	to	
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Aims	 When	 assessing	 interpretation	 of	 ambiguous	 information,	 the	ambiguous	materials	used	should	be	capable	of	generating	both	benign	or	threat	related	outcomes	that	are	related	to	a	measure	of	trait	worry.		
Method	Ambiguous	 scenarios	 were	 selected	 from	 a	 large	 database	 of	scenarios	 compiled	 for	 the	purposes	 of	 a	 research	 trial	 in	 the	 lab.	 In	order	 to	 examine	whether	materials	 elicited	 both	 benign	 and	 threat	outcomes	 and	 that	 these	 related	 to	 trait	 worry,	 120	 ambiguous	statements	 with	 the	 final	 disambiguating	 word	 missing	 were	presented	completed	by	participants	through	the	MTurk	website.	The	statements	represented	a	range	of	worry	domains	(Tallis,	Davey,	Bond,	1994).	In	order	to	reduce	participant	burden,	three	surveys	were	set-up	with	 and	50	participants	were	 required	 to	 complete	 each	 survey,	where	 they	 completed	 40	 statements	 each.	 Due	 to	 a	 technical	 error,	one	 survey	had	43	 respondents.	 Participants	 read	 the	 statement	 and	were	 asked	 to	 provide	 one	 word	 that	 completed	 the	 statement.	Participants	also	completed	a	measure	of	measure	of	trait	worry	(Penn	State	Worry	Questionnaire;	Meyer, Miller, Metzeger & Borkovec, 1990)	and	 a	 measure	 of	 general	 anxiety	 symptoms	 (Generalised	 Anxiety	Disorder	 questionnaire	 	 (GAD-7;	 Spitzer,	 Kroenke,	Williams,	&	 Löwe,	2006).	Participants	received	a	small	fee	for	completing	the	survey.		Once	survey	results	were	collected,	a	researcher	in	the	lab	(SD)	coded	the	one	word	answers	as	negative	or	positive	 in	valence,	 if	 the	answer	completed	the	sentence	in	a	coherent	manner.	Where	the	one	word	answer	did	not	provide	a	coherent	ending	 to	 the	sentence,	 this	response	was	not	included	in	the	analysis.	A	subset	of	responses	from	each	survey	were	coded	by	a	 second	researcher	 (FM)	 to	check	 inter-rater	reliability	there	was	98.25%	agreement	between	the	two	sets	of	
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ratings.	 In	 three	 cases,	 scenarios	 received	 only	 benign	 or	 threat	responses,	 which	 indicated	 that	 they	 were	 not	 ambiguous	 in	 nature	and	they	were	excluded	from	the	analysis.		
Data	analysis	In	 each	 survey,	 the	 relationship	 between	 trait	 worry	 and	tendency	 to	provide	positive	and	negative	responses	were	examined.	Responses	in	each	survey	were	then	assessed	for	their	relationship	to	worry.	 In	order	 to	explore	 the	data,	a	 logistic	 regression	was	used	 to	examine	 whether	 a	 continuous	 measures	 of	 trait	 worry	 (PSWQ)	predicted	a	dichotomous	outcome.	As	a	second	exploratory	approach	we	split the dataset by those high on worry (PSWQ > 56 and low on worry 
(PSWQ < 34) and used	 a	 chi	 square	 test	 to	 look	 at	 the	 relationship	between	worry	group	and	response	(negative/benign).	
Participant	demographics		Mean	 PSWQ	 across	 all	 three	 surveys	was	 46.48	 (SD	 =	 15.66).	See	Table	 1	 for	 the	mean	 (standard	deviation	 in	 parentheses)	 PSWQ	and	GAD	7	scores	for	those	who	completed	each	survey.			Table	1	Mean	(standard	deviation	in	parentheses)	PSWQ	and	GAD	7	scores	for	those	who	completed	each	survey.	Survey	number		 PSWQ	(SD)	 GAD	7	(SD)	1	(N	=	50)	 45.44	(15.33)	 5.90	(6.02)	2	(N	=	50)	 48.52	(17.82)	 6.36	(5.94)	3	(N	=	43)	 45.33	(13.32)	 5.07	(4.87)		
Relationship	 between	 trait	worry	 and	number	 of	 negative	 and	positive	
responses	to	ambiguous	scenarios		We	examined	the	relationship	between	trait	worry	scores	(PSWQ)	and	the	 number	 of	 negative	 and	 positive	 responses	 to	 scenarios	 in	 each	survey.			
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	Table	2	Correlations	 between	 trait	 worry	 scores	 (PSWQ)	 and	 the	 number	 of	negative	and	positive	responses	to	scenarios	in	each	survey	PSWQ	 Number	 of	 benign	responses		 Number	 of	 negative	responses		Survey	1	PSWQ	total	 -.458**	 .384**	Survey	2	PSWQ	total		 -.619**	 .644**	Survey	3	PSWQ	total	 -.177	 .173	**	correlation	is	significant	at	0.01	level	(two	tailed)			 Using	 the	 criteria	 outlined	 above	 we	 used	 6	 scenarios	 from	Survey	1	and	19	scenarios	from	Survey	2	and	2	scenarios	from	Survey	3.	As	a	less	stringent	guideline	we	also	employed	scenarios	that	were	correlated	with	PSWQ	scores	 at	 a	 trend	or	 significant	 level	 and	used	these	scenarios.	Finally	we	used	the	scenarios	where	the	outcome	was	significantly	predicted	by	PSWQ	scores	as	exemplars	and	consulted	the	database	of	ambiguous	scenarios	created	for	a	larger	related	study	and	extracted	 scenarios	which	were	 similar	 to	 those	 predicted	 by	 PSWQ	scores,	or	modified	existing	ambiguous	scenarios	to	be	more	like	those	where	 the	 positive	 or	 benign	 outcome	 had	 been	 predicted	 by	 PSWQ	scores.	 	In	total	we	used	60	scenarios,	30	in	each	list	of	which	15	had	negative	and	15	had	positive	outcomes.		
Example	scenarios	Negatively	resolved	scenario	While	driving,	you	notice	a	strange	sound	coming	 from	your	car.	You	drive	 on	 to	 the	 nearest	 garage	 to	 have	 it	 checked.	 As	 the	 mechanic	looks	over	your	car,	he	says	repairing	it	will	be	e_pen_ive	Positively	resolved	scenario	You	 are	 at	 your	 child’s	 nursery	 talking	 to	 their	 nursery	 teacher.	 The	nursery	 teacher	 tells	 you	 about	 your	 child’s	 behaviour	 and	 suggests	that	 it	may	be	due	 to	your	parenting	style	 that	 they	are	behaving	so:	we_l	
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number:  HR15/162300 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Understanding thought patterns in worry 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this original research project, funded by 
King’s College. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part 
will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study is designed to help us understand why some people find it difficult to 
stop worrying. Most people worry from time to time, but usually this passes fairly 
quickly.  However, some people find that once they start worrying, it is very difficult 
to stop.  Research studies have shown that, rather than helping to resolve personal 
problems, focusing on negative topics during a worry bout usually causes anxiety 
and worry to get worse and to persist longer. However, we know very little about 
why or how some people are able to control negative thinking such as worry while 
others find it so difficult.  In the present study we hope to learn more about what 
can make negative thoughts in worry so persistent and what people can do to 
prevent such thoughts getting out of control. Gaining a better understanding of 
these issues is important if we are to develop more effective psychological 
treatments for worry in the future. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in this study? 
You have been invited to take part in the study because you are between 18 and 
65 years of age and have English as a first language. You have completed an 
online worry questionnaire and have been invited to take part in the main study. 
The study is not suitable for people who have a psychiatric diagnosis, an acute or 
chronic health condition, or are taking medication.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you decide you would like to take part in the study, you will be asked to attend 
one session at King’s College London, Denmark Hill at a date/time convenient for 
you. The study will last approximately 2hrs 15 mins. During the session you will be 
asked to complete some questionnaires which will ask for details about yourself 
(age/height/current health etc.), your worries and emotions. We will then ask you to 
wear a small heart rate monitor which attaches by two disposable sticky pads. One 
pad goes just below your right collar bone and one on your left rib-cage. We will 
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explain to you where to put the pads and you attach them yourself. We will then 
ask you to complete some tasks on a computer. Task 1 will ask you to read some 
scenarios and individual words. In the next task, you will be asked to read 
scenarios and then be presented with a number of sentences. You will rate how 
similar the sentences are to the original scenario. You will be asked to complete 
these tasks twice during the study. In a 3rd task you will be asked to listen to some 
short scenarios and answer some questions.  At certain points during the study you 
will be asked to focus on your breathing for 5 minutes, and from time to time briefly 
saying what you’re thinking about. Afterwards, we will ask you for a bit more detail 
about those thoughts. At another point, you will be asked to identify a topic that you 
are currently worrying about that you are comfortable talking about and to describe 
it briefly to us (verbally or in writing). After that, we will then ask you to worry about 
that topic for a few minutes as you normally would. At the end of the study you will 
be debriefed. You will have an opportunity to talk to the experimenter about the 
study and ask any questions that you may have and you will be asked to complete 
a form that will ensure that you are paid for taking part in the study.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
The study involves thinking about some current worries. Some people might find 
some of these tasks uncomfortable or mildly distressing, but that feeling will go 
away once the task stops and will have no long-term impact. The study does not 
provide any diagnostic information about physical or mental health conditions. If the 
study brings up any concerns, you will have the opportunity to discuss them with 
the researcher at the end of the study and all participants who take part in the 
study will receive a standard debrief sheet which provides information about what 
to do if you are feeling concerned abut your health. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope that you will find it interesting to take part in this research.  Also, the 
information we get from this study should help us to understand more about why 
some people cannot stop worrying Because research of this kind addresses 
questions to which we do not yet know the answers, it is impossible to know if 
taking part will be personally helpful, although we certainly hope that some of the 
techniques involved will help participants to worry less.  Finally, we are happy to 
provide full information about the results of the study in which you took part, so that 
you can be informed of any methods that proved especially helpful. If you would 
like a copy of the research findings, please let the researcher know, and we will 
arrange for a copy of the final written report to be sent to you as soon as it is 
available. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Information which is collected about you during the course of the research, 
including audio recordings, your answers to questionnaires and computer based 
tasks, will be kept strictly confidential. This means, you will be given a participant 
number and that the only way to identify you will be by your numerical ID, to ensure 
anonymity. All information will be kept strictly confidential unless any information is 
disclosed which could seriously affect the welfare of yourself or others, in which 
case a third party may have to be contacted for legal reasons.   
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These data will be stored securely in anonymised form in King’s College London for 
up to seven years, in either a locked filing cabinet or storage facility if in paper 
format, or on a password protected computer if in electronic format, all in 
anonymised form. This information will only be seen by members of the research 
team.   
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The findings will be used to improve psychological treatments for worry and 
anxiety. The results of the study will be published in a peer reviewed journal, 
presented at conferences and discussed at other public events. Individual data will 
not be reported and you will not be identified in any report or publication.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery (PNM) 
Research Ethics Subcommittee (RESC) at King's College London (ref no. 
HR15/162300). 
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. Please take time to think about 
whether you would like to take part in the study. If you decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign two copies of the 
consent form, one of which you will keep. If you decide to take part you are still free 
to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
 
For general queries about the study, please contact Dr Fran Meeten by email: 
frances.meeten@kcl.ac.uk, or at the following address: Department of Psychology, 
PO 77, Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park, London SE5 8AF. If this study 
has harmed you in any way you can contact the study supervisor, Dr Colette 






CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information 
Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Understanding thought patterns in worry 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee 
Ref:________________ 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person 
organising the research must explain the project to you before you 
agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the 
Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask 
the researcher before you decide whether to join in. If you decide to 
take part in the study, you will be emailed a copy of the Information 
Sheet and the Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by ticking each box I am 
consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will 
be assumed that unclicked boxes mean that I DO NOT consent 
to that part of the study. I understand that by not giving 






1. *I confirm that I have read and understood the 
information sheet ‘Understanding thought patterns in 
worry’ dated [Version number 1 – 16.02.16] for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information and asked questions which have been 
answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. *I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time without giving any 
reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to 
withdraw my data up to 4 weeks after completing the 
study. 
 
3. *I consent to the processing of my personal information 
for the purposes explained to me.  I understand that 
such information will be handled in accordance with the 







4. *I understand that my information may be subject to 
review by responsible individuals from the College for 
monitoring and audit purposes. 
 
5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be 
maintained and it will not be possible to identify me in 
any publications   
 
 
6. I agree to be contacted in the future by King’s College 
London researchers who would like to invite me to 
participate in follow up studies to this project, or in 
future studies of a similar nature. 
 
 
7. I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the 
exclusion criteria as detailed in the information sheet 
and explained to me by the researcher. 
 
8.  I consent to completing questionnaires and reading 
scenarios that may cause mild anxiety. 
 





10. I consent to discussing a worry topic in the study that 
may be personally relevant to me. I understand that I can 






__________________               __________________           
__________________       
Name of Participant                 Date   




__________________               __________________           
__________________       
Name of Researcher                 Date   
 Signature       			
